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THE INSANITY DEFENSE-AN EFFORT
TO COMBINE LAW AND REASON
RIcRARD H. Ku:Er t
"I may appeal to all who hear me, whether there are any causes more dill-
cult, or which, indeed, so often confound the learning of the judges themselves,
as when insanity, or the effects and consequences of insanity, become the
subjects of legal consideration and judgment."
-THoMAs ERsxiNE, The Trial of James Hazdfield
With popular interest in psychiatry increasing, the attention com-
manded by the defense of insanity has been growing.' Although much
criticism of the most commonly used standards has come from non-
lawyers,' one of the major censures and alternate proposals emanates
from a particularly busy federal appellate court,' and another from the
American Law Institute4 Yet none of the existing or proposed in-
sanity standards provides a harmonious marriage between today's
psychiatric knowledge and our common-law system of trial by jury.
t Administrative Assistant to the District Attorney, New York County. Lecturer
on Criminal Procedure, New York University School of Law. A.B. 1941, Columbia
University; LLB. 1948, Harvard University. The views expressed in this article in
no way represent the official views of the Office of the District Attorney of New York
County. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful criticism of Jerome E.
Hyman, of the New York bar.
1 See, e.g., Bazelon, The Awesome Decision, The Saturday Evening Post, Jan. 23,
1960, p. 32.
2 See, e.g., Coxmm. ox PSYCHIATRY AND LAW OF THE GRouP FOR THE ADVANCE-
MENT OF PSYCHIATRY, CRntixAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PSYCHIATRIC ExPERT TESTI-
mONY (Report No. 26, 1954); ZILBORG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRINAL AcT
AND PUNISHMENT (1954).
8 See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
4 MoDF. PENAL CODE §§ 4.01-.09 & comments (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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Whereas critics decry the McNaughton " rules' failure to reflect a con-
ception of the personality which is compatible with the views of modem
psychiatry, the application of more modem proposals in the framework
of our traditional legal method of trial by jury seems, at best, strained.
Yet emphasis must be placed upon the jury trial. As long as the in-
sanity defense is to have a place in our common-law criminal trial, then
trial personnel-trial lawyers, trial judges, and, most important, trial
jurors-are the persons who must use whatever standards the law fixes
for determining criminal responsibility. In evaluating the various
insanity defense standards, the capabilities of the triers of fact, func-
tioning within the framework of a criminal jury trial, cannot be
ignored.
This article, after examining the jury-trial application of each of
the insanity standards, present and proposed, will suggest a possible
alternative: to remove the insanity issue from the jury so that con-
temporary scientific knowledge can be employed in a setting that will
be more conducive to rendering this knowledge helpful.
While considering the methods by which our common-law trial
juries determine questions of insanity, however, one should bear in
mind that the imperfections of this defense do not jeopardize the
administration of justice in most cases. The impression that the
McNaughton rules are sending a multitude of insane persons to prison
is without foundation.' The fear that adoption-of one of the newer
and more scientific standards would allow a number of skilled
malingerers to avoid prison is equally unjustified.7 Without detract-
ing from the fascination posed by problems of the insanity defense, or
from the importance to sound law enforcement of their solution, it
must be recognized that quantitatively both of these alarmist views are
far removed from reality.
5 The spelling of this oft-misspelled name here follows that used by the accused
himself.
6 Thus, a letter from Daniel Gutman, formerly counsel to the Governor of New
York, says that "many serious crimes are committed by persons who are mentally ill
but who, in the light of the McNaghten rule, must be adjudicated as sane; and herein
lies the danger." N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1959, p. 26, col. 5. Cf. BIGGS, THE Gun-.TY
MIND 121-45 (1955); WERTHAM, THE SHow OF VIOLENCE 65-94 (1949). However,
a survey of more than 71,000 examinations conducted over a twenty-five year period by
the Psychiatric Clinic of the New York County Court of General Sessions reveals
that the number of convicted defendants considered psychotic "has rarely exceeded
1o annually, and has generally been far less." See MESSINGER & APFELBERG, A
QUARTER CENTURY OF COURT PSYCHIATRY 6 & chart 1 (1957). See, to the same
general effect, Guttmacher, The Psychiatric Approach to Crime and Correction, 23
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 633, 640 (1958); Hagopian, Mental Abnormalities it
Criminals Based on Briggs Law Cases, 109 AM. J. PsYcH. 486, 488 (1953).
7 Compare Roche, Durham and the Problem of Communication, 29 TEMP. L.Q.
264, 270 (1956), with Clayton, Six Years After Durham, 44 J. AM. Jim. Soc'y 18-19
(1960).
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Of those defendants who might make a bona fide claim of in-
sanity, very few assert this defense and have it tried out before a jury.
This is true for two reasons. Many defendants may as a matter of
discreet foresight prefer not to defend on the ground of insanity.' This
will depend in large part on the gap between the likely limits of sen-
tence for the crime charged and the indefinite institutional commitment
faced by one acquitted as insane. A last-ditch tactic, this defense is
rarely employed except in capital cases when it is invoked to forfend
against the ultimate in punishment' In addition, many defendants
who might make an insanity defense at trial never get the opportunity
to do so; their insanity makes them unfit to stand trial and subject
to commitment to a mental institution as long as the illness continues."0
By the time such a defendant has regained his sanity and is returned
to stand trial, the prosecutor, considering the duration of the de-
fendant's commitment or the difficulties of proving an old case, may
drop the charges or offer a lesser plea."
I. THE JURY SYSTEM
The selection of an insanity standard for use in our criminal
courts cannot be based solely on psychiatric considerations. Psychiatry
is concerned with mental health or illness, law with order in society.
The law must emphasize not the illness of persons who commit crimes,
but whether--consistent with fairness to the accused-attributing crim-
inal responsibility will further a peaceable and well-ordered com-
munity. Moreover, because the judgment of conviction or acquittal is
made by a criminal trial jury functioning in our common-law tradi-
tion, intelligent selection of a proper standard for mental responsi-
bility requires full appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of
juries and of the rules which govern jurors' deliberations.
A standard for the guidance of lay jurors cannot be patterned after
one that might be used for the staff conferences of a mental institu-
8 See Berman, Is It Time To Revise the McNaughton Rule Relating to the De-
fense of Insanity in Criminal Law?, 29 N.Y. STATE B.A. BUL. 407, 414 (1957);
Weihofen, A Question of Justice: Trial or Execution of an Insane Defendant, 37
A.B.A.J. 651, 654, 710 (1951); Royal Comm'n on Capital Punishment, Report, Cisn.
No. 8932, at 106 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Royal Comm'n Rep.]. In Tremblay v.
Overholser, 199 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1961), a federal court held that it is improper
for a trial court to compel a defendant to adopt an insanity defense.
9 See, e.g., Royal Comm'n Rep. 104-05; Krash, The Durhain Rule and Judicial
Administration of the Insanity Defense in the District of Columbia, 70 YAE L.J.
905, 908, 926-27 (1961) ; cf. Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal
Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 832, 834-35 (1960).
10 See, e.g., Mfieller, Procedure to Determine Responsibility and Fitness to Pro-
ceed in Criminal Cases, 3 CRIm. L. REv. 29 (1956). See generally WEIHOFEN, MENTAL
DrSoRa AS A CRImINAL DEFENSE 428-74 (1954).
11 See Ploscowe, Suggested Changes in the New York Laws and Procedures
Relating to the Criminally Insane and Mentally Defective Offenders, 43 J. CRMI. L.,
C. & P.S. 312, 316-17 (1952).
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tion. 2 This results not only from the differences in schooling of
jurors and of psychiatrists, but from the use in jury trials of concepts
that would be deemed exceedingly strange were they employed in the
hospital psychiatric conference. Among these are the necessity for
unanimity among the sizable number of conferees, the obligation of
that "diagnostician" (the prosecutor), who urges that no illness is
present, to prove his conclusions beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
exclusion from consideration of items likely to be highly relevant to a
psychiatric diagnosis. In considering standards for the insanity de-
fense, these items and how they operate must be kept in mind.
A. The Need for Unanimity Among Lay Jurors
In criminal cases a jury verdict generally requires the concur-
rence of all."3 Jurors, however, ordinarily lack any common discipline
in or mutual understanding of psychiatry that might tend to guide
their thinking along similar lines. Not only do our laws not provide
for special juries of psychiatrists or psychologists in cases in which
mental condition may be the only fact at issue, but in practice either
the prosecutor or defense counsel would ordinarily challenge peremp-
torily any psychologist, social worker, or identifiable amateur "psychi-
atrist" on the jury panel in an insanity defense case. He would fear
that such a juror might judge the opinions of expert witnesses in the
light of his own training rather than pursuant to the rules supplied in
the court's charge and that the other jurors might look to him for ex-
pert advice, rather than to the witnesses' testimony.
Since jurors must act unanimously despite their lack of any com-
mon psychiatric training, the standard provided for their determination
of whether or not a defendant is to be held responsible for his anti-
social acts should be one that they can apply in terms of their own
everyday experiences and common sense.'4
If, on the other hand, the insanity standard compels jurors to
make unaccustomed medical diagnoses in the area of abnormal
12 See Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65 YALE L.J. 761, 770-71
(1956). Compare Guttmacher, Why Psychiatrists Do Not Like to Testify in Court,
Prac. Law., May 1955, p. 50, at 51.
13 There has been some consideration of changing the rule that requires unanimity
for the rendering of a criminal verdict; a few states have already done so, and Scot-
land has never had such a rule. See Dv.vIN, TRIAL BY JURY 54-57 (1956) ; OarMnM,
CR.IINAL PROCEDURE FRo ARREST TO APPEAl 481-83 (1947).
14Harold Laski, writing to Mr. Justice Holmes about his experience in chairing
a discussion of criminal responsibility between a criminal lawyer and a "great mental
specialist" remarked: "The medicals spoke passionately of 'uncontrollable impulses'
and such like; Humphreys [the attorney] always drove them back to the vital point
of getting definitions which could be explained by a judge to an average jury, and I
thought he showed admirably that the refinements of psychological analysis are not
yet ripe for legal use." 1 HOLMEs-LAsKI LETrERS 805 (Howe ed. 1953).
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psychology, they will have to rely almost wholly upon the expert
diagnosticians. In most insanity cases that go to trial the experts will
differ in their diagnoses. 5 Consequently, the chances that con-
scientious jurors will all be able to agree that they have been convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt are diminished.
The charge to a jury is, in most jurisdictions, delivered orally.
Although jurors may return to ask that parts be recited to them again
or explained further, the charge, unlike an exhibit, cannot be carried
into the jury room for detailed study."8 Although appellate courts
worry over slight verbal improprieties in charges, realistically, the
broad sweep of a charge is likely to be what counts most to jurors. A
charge expressed in scientific terminology and abstractions, rather than
in homely examples from which jurors can draw its essence, may be
confusing." Rather than guide the jurors, it may minimize chances for
agreement or cause them to resort to their own devices."8 In juris-
dictions in which the judge may comment on the evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses-in effect, express his own opinion on the
merits of the case-the charge may serve as a guiding force toward
unanimity among the jurors, especially when there are testimonial con-
flicts that might otherwise tend to split them asunder.1 " But these
jurisdictions are a minority in the United States.20
Finally, there is the recent and pervasive influence of motion pic-
tures, television, and the press. Beside propagating various forms of
pseudo-psychiatric learning, these media have been dealing frequently
with the role of the independent juror and the theme of the innocent
man charged with crime.2' Insofar as they have increased defendants'
protection against thoughtless or callous juries, their influence is de-
sirable. But experience indicates that they may also have fostered
15 See Cavanagh, The Responsibility of the Mentally Ill for Criminal Offenses,
4 CATHOLIC LA-W. 317, 322-23 (1958); Davidson, Psychiatrists in Administration of
Criminal Justice, 45 J. CRm. L., C. & P.S. 12-14 (1954); Hall, supra note 12, at
770-73; Meyers, The Riddle of Legal Insanity, 44 J. Cmm. L., C. & P.S. 330 (1953).
16 See generally ORFIELD, op. cit. supra note 13, at 448-56.
17 Compare the language used in McNaughto charges, text accompanying notes
58-59 infra, with the proposed Durham charge, note 83 infra.
18 See Royal Comm'n Rep. 82-85, 102.
19 The Wickersham report, commenting on the use of expert testimony concerning
insanity, has noted: "We must rely chiefly on strong trial judges, enabled to charge
the jury with respect to the expert evidence and guide them to an intelligent appraisal
of it." NATL COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 37 (1931).
20 See ORIEID, op. cit. supra note 13, at 457-59. See generally Otis, Comment
to the Jury by the Trial Judge, 27 A.B.A.J. 749 (1941). In England, "a judge is
permitted to express his opinion freely and, if he wishes, strongly." DEVI.IN, TIrA
By JuRY 118 (1956).
2 1 Thus, in "Twelve Angry Men," a television play later made into a motion
picture, an eleven-to-one pro-conviction jury, by the story's end, voted solidly-and
apparently justly-for acquittal. See also FRANK & FRANK, NOT GuiLTY (1957).
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imaginary and speculative doubts, leading to hung juries or acquittals
in cases where the facts, realistically considered, afford no basis for
either. Insanity defense cases, in which apparently honest experts are
commonly in total disagreement, are particularly vulnerable to this
kind of thinking by jurors.
B. The Prosecution's Burden of Proof
Although the original formulation of the McNaughton rules in-
cluded a presumption that persons are sane and responsible for their
crimes "until the contrary be proved to their [the jurors'] satisfac-
tion," ' thus placing on the defendant the burden of proving his in-
sanity,23 in about half of the states in the United States the burden of
proof of "sanity" or of the defendant's ability to possess the necessary
criminal intent, as with all elements of the crime, rests on the prosecu-
tion. 4 The significance of the prosecution's burden of proof, an ele-
ment of major importance in the trial of a criminal case, is completely
lost on some who have written to urge major changes in our standards
of sanity in criminal trials.
2 5
As all criminal conduct is, by definition, a departure from the
norm in an essentially law-abiding society, so most criminal conduct
may-in the eyes of a respectable body of psychiatric opinion-be some
indication of "disease." 2 If wrongful conduct may be indicative of
"disease" and the existence of "disease" may in turn tend to excuse
from criminal responsibility, the burden of proving the existence or
absence of "disease" and the measure of proof that is required can be
most important. If the prosecution must prove that disease was absent
or that the crime did not result from it, and must do so by proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt, then-assuming that juries are able to and
do follow instructions-the prosecution can seldom be successful.
However, if the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the
22 M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 822 (H.L. 1843).
2 3 See Royal Comm'n Rep. 81. As a concomitant to the burden of proof being
on the defendant, if the trial judge finds that no real evidence of insanity has been
produced, he can withdraw the defense from the jury's consideration. See DEVLIN,
TRIAL By JURY 85-86 (1956).
24 See WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 10, at 212-72. The defendant universally
has the burden of coming forward and claiming insanity, but this burden must be
distinguished from the burden of proof.
2 5 See, e.g., CoMM. ON PSYCHIATRY AND LAW, op. cit. supra note 2; Roche, supra
note 7, at 264.
26 See, e.g., ABRAHAMSEN, WHo ARE THE GuILTY? 125 (1952); ROCHE, THE
CRIMINAL MIND 29 (1958) ; Karpman, Criminality, Insanity and the Law, 39 J. CRns.
L. & C. 584 (1948). These ideas are not new. See 2 STEPHEN, A HISTORY oF THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 126 (1883). Dr. Gregory Zilboorg traced the concept
that all crime springs from madness back to Duns Scotus and St. Thomas, in the
thirteenth century. ZILBOORG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL ACT AND PUNISH-
MENT 75-76 (1954).
THE INSANITY DEFENSE-LAW AND REASON
evidence that his wrongful act in fact did result from a disease, the
result may be quite different.
C. The Rules of Evidence and Privilege
In evaluating efforts to bring modem psychiatry into the common-
law jury trial by means of a scientifically sound test which juries are to
apply to questions of sanity, some highlights of the manner in which
science may come out second best in our law courts should be con-
sidered2 Briefly, information which might be useful in determining
a defendant's mental condition may be made inaccessible to the prosecu-
tion, information which is accessible may nevertheless be excluded from
evidence, and information which is admitted may be subject to dis-
tortion by the form in which it must be presented.
1. The Defendant's Privileges
A foundation stone of modem psychiatry is the concept that we
are all, to a great extent, the products of our past experiences2 8 If a
sound psychiatric diagnosis is to assist in determining whether or not
a defendant is criminally responsible, the psychiatrist must have an
opportunity to observe and talk with the patient and-more impor-
tant-to encourage the patient to talk about himself. But the privilege
against self-incrimination bars compelling a defendant to provide testi-
monial evidence which may be used against him.' Although the
courts have struggled to find a lack of compulsion in instances in which
psychiatric examinations have been ordered, logically, this privilege
would seem to preclude mandatory examinations in the course of which
the defendant might be encouraged to discuss his own allegedly crim-
inal conduct °
2 For a thorough critique of the role of the rules of evidence in the search for
the truth in our adversary system, see MORGAN, SOM PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE
ANGLO-AIERUCAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 169-95 (1956).28See GuTImAcHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 18-26 (1952);
Nox-Es & KoLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYcHIATRY 20-32 (5th ed. 1958). For case
histories, see ABRA A SEN, WHo ARE THE GurILT? (1952) and THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF CRIME (1960).
29 See 8 WIGmoRE, EVIBENCE §§ 2263, 2265 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
SoAmong the reasons advanced to justify such examinations in the face of the
privilege have been: that the defendant consented, see Jessner v. State, 202 Wis. 184,
189-90, 231 N.W. 634, 637 (1930) ; that the defendant was free not to cooperate with
the examiners or to answer their questions, even though the examination was court or-
dered, see Hunt v. State, 248 Ala. 217, 224-26, 27 So. 2d 186, 193-94 (1946) ; Clements
v. State, 213 Ark. 460, 462-63, 210 S.W.2d 912, 913 (1948); People v. Furlong, 187
N.Y. 198, 209-12, 79 N.E. 978, 982-83 (1907) ; Commonwealth v. Musto, 348 Pa. 300,
305-07, 35 A.2d 307, 311 (1944) ; that the ordering court would bar the use in evidence
of any "confession" elicited in the examination, see State v. Myers, 220 S.C. 309, 313,
67 S.E.2d 506, 507-08 (1951); and simply that such examination is the "ordinary
procedure," People v. Truck, 170 N.Y. 203, 212, 63 N.E. 281, 283 (1902). The asser-
tion of an insanity defense has itself been said to constitute a waiver of the privilege
1962]
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The full impact of this rule is best seen when viewed in the light
of the prosecution's burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
If the standard is to be psychiatrically oriented-with "disease" and
"causation" among the ultimate questions-experts are almost certain
to be necessary witnesses. But if the prosecution's experts are to be
cut off from conducting a complete examination of the defendant, how
can the prosecution reasonably be expected to be able to sustain its
burden? Since the goal of defense counsel in a criminal trial need only
be to sow successfully the seed of reasonable doubt, it may serve a
defendant to assert his privilege, to prevent court or prosecution ex-
perts from examining him, and at the same time to call as his own wit-
nesses friendly experts to whose examinations he has willingly sub-
mitted21 If a defendant's refusal to submit to questioning cannot be
the subject of comment by the court or prosecutor in the presence of
the jury, 2 the prosecution will find it difficult to resolve a doubt which
may, to laymen untutored in the law, appear reasonable: Why has the
prosecution, having the burden of proof, not procured an expert to
examine the defendant and testify as to his sanity?
insofar as it might otherwise be violated by a psychiatric examination. See People v.
Esposito, 287 N.Y. 389, 397-98, 39 N.E.2d 925, 928 (1942). But see People v. Fazio,
132 N.Y.S.2d 107 (County Ct. 1954). A prior confession by the defendant has been
cited to show that the purpose of the examination was solely medical and not to compel
the defendant to incriminate himself. United States ex rel. Daverse v. Hohn, 198
F.2d 934, 937 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 913 (1953). In cases arising
under state sexual psychopath laws, which provide for psychiatric examination, ex-
aminations have been held not to constitute any invasion of the privilege in that they
are for use in civil, not criminal, proceedings. See People v. Chapman, 301 Mich.
584, 602-04, 4 N.W.2d 18, 26-27 (1942) ; In re Moulton, 96 N.H. 370, 372-73, 77 A.2d
26, 27-28 (1950) ; State ex rel. Sweezer v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 1253-54, 232 S.W.2d
897, 900 (1950).
Professor Fred Inbau has suggested another basis for finding mandatory psy-
chiatric examinations not an invasion of the privilege: that the examination need not
touch on the events at the time of the crime directly. INBAU, SELF-INCRIMINATION
-WHAT CAN AN AccusED PERsoN BE COMPELLED To Do? 55-58 (1950).
The constitutionality of such testimonial compulsion is still debated. Compare
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.05, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955), with Weihofen,
Procedure for Determining Defendant's Mental Condition Under the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code, 29 TEMP. L.Q. 235, 239-41 (1956).
31 See Halleck, The Insanity Defense in the District of Columbia-A Legal
Loreli, 49 GEo. L.J. 294, 302-03 (1960).
32 If the jury is not permitted to draw adverse inferences from a defendant's
failure to testify, see 8 WIGM ORE, EVIDENCE § 2272, at 427 n.2, 435 nn.4 & 5 (Mc-
Naughton rev. 1961), and this same principle prevents either testimony or comment
indicative of a defendants failure to answer questions put by the police, People v.
Travato, 309 N.Y. 382, 131 N.E.2d 557 (1955), logically, it would seem also to bar
testimony or comment indicative of a defendant's refusal to submit to psychiatric
examination. But cf. United States ex rel. Draper v. Denno, 113 F. Supp. 290
(S.D.N.Y.), affd mem., 205 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1953) (refusal to allow administration
of sodium amytal during psychiatric examination) ; State v. Smith, 230 S.C. 164, 94
S.E.2d 886 (1956) (refusal to submit to chemical test for intoxication). On the
other hand, some modern commentators disapprove even the underlying rule barring
comment on refusal to testify, and a few states have abandoned it. See McCoaRmic,
EVIDENCE § 132 (1954).
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There are two further aspects of our accusatory system which per-
mit the defendant to sit tight and say nothing, seriously hampering the
prosecution's ability to prepare for trial. One is the physician-patient
privilege.3  Although that privilege is deemed waived to the extent
that the defendant himself invades it,34 until he actually puts in medical
evidence on his own behalf, the defendant may successfully prevent the
prosecution from inspecting the results of any psychiatric examination
to which he may have submitted; in some jurisdictions he can even
close the records of a public hospital to which he has been committed
and seal the lips of any publicly employed physician who may have
examined him.3 5
Second, in the many jurisdictions where the defendant need not
even plead an insanity defense before his trial commences, 6 the prose-
cutor may be barred from anticipating and commenting to the jurors
concerning that defense until after all of the state's proof has been put
in. 7  Hence, a defendant may have it within his control to prevent
any inquiry on voir dire into what preconceptions prospective jurors
may have as to standards for determining criminal responsibility or
their ability to evaluate fairly and intelligently the highly specialized
testimony of psychiatric experts.
2. Rules of Relevance and Hearsay
Not only must psychiatric experts have a full opportunity to
examine the defendant if their testimony is to be as helpful as possible,
but, if the ultimate decision is to be rendered by lay jurors who have
heard the probably conflicting testimony of expert witnesses, much of
the information on which the experts' diagnoses are premised must be
33 See generally Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Ob-
structed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607
(1943). With regard to psychiatric testimony in particular, see GUTrMcHcF &
WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 269-84 (1952).
34 See 8 WiGmoa, EVIDENcE §§2388-90 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
35 See cases cited in 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2382(3), at 839 n.10 (McNaughton
rev. 1961). Two extreme recent examples sustaining claims of privilege are People
v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 138 N.E.2d 799, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1956) (testimony of
county hospital physician who had treated defendant after his arrest while he was
under guard) and In the Matter of Criminal Abortions in the County of Kings, 286
App. Div. 270, 143 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1955) (grand jury investigating abortions barred
from inspecting records of county hospital). In Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d
398 (D.C. Cir. 1955), a conviction was reversed on the ground that the trial judge
erred in compelling the testimony of a doctor who treated the defendant during the
period of his pretrial commitment to a federal institution while unable to stand trial;
the doctor testified that the defendant said he was "going along with a gag" when he
claimed to have hallucinated. District of Columbia law has since been amended to
make such testimony available. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-308 (Supp. 1960).
36 See WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 10, at 357-61; Gasch, Prosecution Problems
Under the Durham Rule, 5 CATHOLIC LAW. 5, 6-7 (1959).
37 Compare Boyle v. State, 229 Ala. 212, 154 So. 575 (1934) ; Williams v. State,
68 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1953), involving comment on disposition of defendant if acquitted
by reason of insanity.
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presented to the jury in evidence. Without this, the jury cannot be in
a position to pass on the conflicting opinions, for they can have no
basis for judging the reliability of the hypotheses on which they are
based. But this is prevented by several basic rules of the criminal trial
court.
Strict standards of relevance must govern the admissibility of
proof in order to avoid a proliferation of issues."8 And even relevant
items must sometimes be excluded to avoid prejudice: background in-
formation seemingly relevant may be excluded to protect a defendant
from being convicted of the crime with which he is charged because
jurors' hostilities are aroused by the suggestion that he has also been
involved in other crimes."9
Although the psychiatrist will rely on the entirety of the patch-
quilt he is able to piece together from all the information he can col-
lect-directly or indirectly-about his patient, statements of a person
who does not appear as a witness, though made to a witness and rele-
vant to the defendant's conduct, are ordinarily excludable hearsay.4 0 A
psychiatrist may find it very useful to know whether the defendant has
manifested mental illness before the act for which he is criminally
charged. He may rely on the opinions of colleagues who have exam-
ined the defendant at other times and on the records of mental hos-
pitals containing such opinions. Yet if the prior experts are unavail-
able for qualification and examination in the courtroom, and if counsel
is alert to object, these earlier diagnoses may be excluded as uncross-
examinable opinion evidence. 1
3. Form of Examination
When the expert psychiatric witness has not had an opportunity
to examine the defendant, he may still testify as to his sanity on the
basis of evidence in the record put to him in the form of hypothetical
questions. A long list of items taken from the record is posed to the
witness and he is asked to assume their existence and to give his
opinion, based on that assumption, as to the defendant's mental con-
dition. Obviously, careful selection of the elements of the question can
3 sSee Holmes, J., in Reeve v. Dennett, 145 Mass. 23, 28, 11 N.E. 938, 943-44
(1887): "[S]o far as the introduction of collateral issues goes, that objection is a
purely practical one, a concession to the shortness of life."
39 See People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901).
40 See People v. Mancuso, 4 App. Div. 2d 1010, 168 N.Y.S2d 331 (1957); 5
WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1361 (3d ed. 1940).
41 See Note, 48 CoLUM. L. REV. 920, 929-30 (1948). Compare Lyles v. United
States, 254 F.2d 725, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961 (1958), with
United States v. Balance, 59 F.2d 1040, 1041-42 (D.C. Cir. 1932). As to the wisdom
of excluding diagnoses contained in psychiatric hospital reports, in the absence of testi-
mony by the expert whose conclusions are being reported, see Diamond, The Fallacy
of the I mpartial Expert, in ARCHIVES OF CRIMINAL PsYcHOn. NAelCS 221 (1959).
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go far in molding the opinion that is elicited. This selectivity can pro-
duce questions that hypothesize an individual bearing only a super-
ficial resemblance to the defendant. As a consequence, many psychi-
atrists have long been displeased with this manner of expressing their
opinions.' If, however, the ultimate question that the jurors must
decide is not a technical, medical one, requiring heavy reliance upon
psychiatric concepts, any confusion interjected by answers to mislead-
ing hypothetical questions may be resolved by that common sense which
is the sound leavening that jurors are deemed to possess.
II. EXISTING AND PROPOSED STANDARDS OF RESPONSIBILITY
Having reviewed some of the differences between a psychiatric
conference and a criminal trial, this article will now consider the impact
of these differences upon the effective use of each of the principal tests
for criminal responsibility.
A. The McNaughton Rules
[T]he jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man
is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree
of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary
be proved to their satisfaction; and that to establish a defence
on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at
the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was
laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he
was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong.3
This statement of the law by the judges of England, in answer
to questions posed by the House of Lords regarding Daniel McNaugh-
ton's case in 1841, when the infant science of psychiatry was replacing
demonology as the source of explanations of criminal insanity," was
based on the belief that man, a creature of his own free will, was to be
held criminally responsible and was to be punished when he chose to
indulge in antisocial conduct. Thus the law would deter other poten-
tial malefactors who would be aware of the possibilities of punishment
in exercising their own power of free choice. 5
42 See OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW 114-17 (1953) ; Davidson,
Psychiatrists in Adminstration of Criminal Justice, 45 J. CRI . L., C. & P.S. 12,
16-17 (1954) ; Guttmacher, supra note 12, at 51-52.
48 M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark. & F. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843).
44 See BIGOs, THE GUILTY MIND 3-34, 71-77 (1955); HENDERSON & GILLESPIE,
PSYCHIATRY FOR STUDENTS AND PRACTITIONERS 4-9 (8th ed. 1956); NOYES & KOLB,
op. cit. supra note 28, at 11-19.
45 For a penetrating analysis indicating the viability of deterrence in today's penal
systems, see Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 401
(1958). See generally Michael, Psychiatry and the Criminal Law, 21 A.B.A.J. 271,
275-76 (1935).
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How do the McNaughton rules hold up today when psychiatry
teaches that what we may "choose" to do is frequently the result not
of unadulterated free choice, but of what we are and what we have
experienced?
1. Emphasis on Cognition
The McNaughton rules rely wholly on the defendant's cognition,
on his ability "to know the nature and quality of the act" and to "know
he was doing what was wrong." But it has become quite clear-at
least to most psychiatrists-that often one may know full well what he
is doing and may know that it is both immoral and illegal but still may
lack the ability to control his actions in accord with this knowledge."
Insofar as the McNaughton rules fail to relieve persons of crim-
inal responsibility who in fact lack the ability to control their actions,
justice under them is imperfect in that they treat as criminals some
persons whose wrongful conduct is not deterrable.47 To this extent,
the McNaughton rules are not only bad science but unsound law.
In an effort to take account of mental illnesses which are not
typified by disturbances of cognition, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen,48
in the late nineteenth century, and Professor Jerome Hall49 and
others 50 in our present generation have urged that the word "know"
involves something broader than mere perception. As man is an
"integrated personality," his knowledge, his will, and his ability to
act are all intertwined. The word "know," as used in McNaughton,
can be taken to mean not only the ability to perceive by use of the
senses and intellect, but the ability to guide or control one's action in
the light of this perception.
This suggestion suffers two distinct disabilities. It is not now
and never has been the law anywhere; no judicial authority has been
found suggesting that the word "know" should be explained in a charge
46 See, e.g., CoMM. ON PSYCHIATRY AND LAW, op. cit. supra note 2, at 4; Royal
Comm'n Rep. 79-80; -aeker & Frym, The Legal Concept of Insanity and the Treat-
ment of Criminal Inpulses, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 575, 581-82 (1949) ; Reik, The Doe-Ray
Correspondence: A Pioneer Collaboration in the Jurisprudence of Mental Disease,
63 YALE LJ. 183, 184-85 (1953).
47 The jury may, under some circumstances, act as a safety valve against such
injustice by "juggling"--as Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it-the matters before them
to avoid inequity. Royal Comm'n Rep. -102.
48 2 STaPHBEN, op. cit. supra note 26, at 163-68.
49 Hall, "Psychiatry and the Law"-A Dual Review, 38 IOwA L. REv. 687, 696
(1953); Hall, Responsibility and Law: In Defense of the McNaghten Rules, 42 A.B.
A.J. 917, 989 (1956).
Zo See, e.g., New York Governor's Conference on the Defense of Insanity, Interim
Report of the Study Committee, May 1958, pp. 3-4 [hereinafter cited as N.Y. Confer-
ence Rep.].
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to a trial jury in this fashion. 5 Moreover, the advantage of the
McNaughton rules-that they can be explained in language and by
examples readily understandable to laymen-is forfeited if jurors must
be told that an apparently simple and common word like "know" has
a meaning that they probably never have heard ascribed to it. The
jurors will then have to resolve the additional problems raised in the
never-never land of control--questions presently irrelevant under the
McNaughton standards, though embraced in the irresistible impulse,
Durham, and American Law Institute tests, hereinafter considered.
2. Difficulties Posed for Experts
The McNaughton standards refer the triers of fact to common
sense and to morality. The determinations they are asked to make can
be made best through reference to the defendant's own actions. But
because the problem is loosely termed one of "insanity" and underlying
mental illness is part of the defense, psychiatrists are often called upon
to testify. Psychiatrists, however, are likely to experience difficulty
when testifying as experts under the McNaughton rules.52 Their
scientific discipline does not qualify them to deal with the nice moral
distinctions of the "right" and "wrong" frame of reference any better
than laymen.53 They are obliged to use laymen's and legal language
to express scientific conclusions, are prone to use the word "know" in
the sense that has most meaning for them-as embracing not only
perception but control, in the fashion already discussed. In so doing,
they become sitting ducks for cutting cross-examination by prosecutors
or trial judges who use the word as the law and the common sense of
trial jurors define it.M
51 See Royal Comm'n Rep. 80: "This somewhat strained and artificial interpre-
tation . . . has not, however, found favour with the judiciary, or with members of
the legal profession generally."
52 See ZxLB0ORG, op. cit. supra note 26, at 106-08, 111-24; N.Y. Conference Rep.
5-7; Stevenson, Insanity as a Defense for Crime: An Analysis of Replies to a Ques-
tionnaire, 25 CAN. B. REv. 871, 876-77 (1947). But see Cavanagh, supra note 15, at
321; Wertham, A Psychiatrist Looks at Psychiatry and the Law, 3 BUFFALO L. REV.
41, 48 (1953); cf. The Experience of Psychiatrists With the MNaghten Rules, 140
N.Y.L.J. No. 91, Nov. 10, 1958, p. 4.
53 CoMM. ON PSYCHlATRY AND LAW, op. cit. supra note 2, at 4-5; Guttmacher,
supra note 12, at 55-56; Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problem of Criminal Responsi-
bility, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 380-81 (1952).
54 In People v. Metesky, typewritten minutes of the hearing in New York County,
Feb. 28, 1957, pp. 10-13, the judge, conducting a hearing on the question of defendant's
ability to enter a not guilty plea to the indictment, examined the psychiatric expert
in this fashion:
Q. . . . Did he know that he was setting off bombs? Did he believe
that he was setting off bombs or setting off switches . . . ? Did he know
what he was doing? .... .. A. Within the normal framework I do not
think so.
Q. Do you suppose that he thought he was eating pie at the time? A.
If I may interject a remark. I mean a large-percentage of the cases suffering
from the mental disorder which he suffers from-
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3. Simplicity for Trial Jurors
Despite the facts that the McNaughton rules are in blatant conflict
with modem psychiatric learning and that they often function as
stumbling blocks to honest expert witnesses, their hardiness has been
repeatedly affirmed in recent years by both judicial action " and legis-
lative inaction.56 Perhaps the principal justification for their continued
life is that they provide tests that are so elementary that trial jurors can
readily understand and follow them without being dependent upon the
experts. Although the words "nature and quality of the act," and
knowledge that "he was doing what was wrong" may, at first blush,
seem cloudy," our law allows them to be communicated by concrete
examples which have unmistakable meaning for lay jurors. A de-
fendant is chargeable with having known the nature of his act if the
jury determines that when he fired a revolver he knew he was firing
a revolver and did not believe he was writing with a pen."8 He is
deemed to have known the quality of his act if, for instance, when "he
plunged that knife into a human being . . [he knew] whether he
was plunging it into a human being or putting it into a stick of
wood." 5 And he may be deemed to have known "he was doing what
Q. I am not interested in other cases . A. I don't think so in the
normal framework. . . .
Q. I am asking you, in your opinion: If he did or did not know the
nature of what he said he was going to do? A. I don't think-again I also
have to say, I don't think that he knew it in the way a normal individual
would.
Q. I didn't ask you to say about a normal individual. I am asking you
a simple question: Did he know, in your opinion, that exploding a bomb is
exploding a bomb? A. Yes, I think he knew that. ....
Q. . . . Did you think that he had an idea that exploding the bombs in
places where people are gathering or met together, is against the conscience
of this community? A. I don't think he did. If he did it didn't make any
impression on him.
55 See cases cited note 81 infra, rejecting the Durham test.
56 Only three jurisdictions have recently moved away from McNaughtom through
legislation: Maine, Vermont, and Illinois. See notes 82, 111-12 infra. In New York,
the Interim Report of a Study Committee of the Governor's Conference on the De-
fense of Insanity, released in May 1958, recommended that New York abandon the
McNaughton rules in favor of a standard approximating that of the American Law
Institute. However, no legislative action has been taken. In Massachusetts, similar
legislation has been proposed by a team of experts-also without provoking favorable
legislative action. See Kozel, The Psychopath Before the Law, Mass. L.Q., July
1959, p. 106, at 115-16. New Jersey and California also have commissions that have,
for some time, been considering the desirability of changes from the McNaughto)
standards.
57 WE IoFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH 35-38 (1956), notes the ambiguities contained
in the express language of McNaughton-; his critique, however, does not consider the
manner in which the courts have given this language certainty.
58 See Record, pp. 4418-19, People v. Burke, 1 N.Y.2d 876, 136 N.E.2d 711, 154
N.Y.S.2d 637 (1956).
59 See Record, p. 2353, People v. Byers, 309 N.Y. 908, 131 N.E.2d 580 (1955)
(question of the court to the defense expert).
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1
was wrong" if his actions reveal his consciousness of guilt. This may
be shown by some effort on his part to avoid discovery or to escape
from apprehension: hiding the murder weapon, wiping away blood or
fingerprints, or making false denials when questioned by police. Any
of these actions are likely to indicate his own recognition that what he
did was "wrong." 60
Trial jurors, having heard well-presented testimony, should be
able to draw some picture in their minds of the defendant's actions
while committing the crime and of his subsequent conduct before and
upon apprehension. Applying the McNaughton standards to this
mental tableau, they need only use their common sense to determine
whether the whole picture is of someone who "knew what he was do-
ing," or of a maniac, suffering under delusions. Using McNaughton,
they need not go behind that picture.
Although there may have been testimony involving reports of
psychiatric examinations, this merely provides background, possibly
helpful, but not vital to the jury's determination. McNaughton jurors
are free to disregard this kind of information or to minimize its im-
portance. Although the standards in theory require that the inability
to know the nature and quality of one's acts or to distinguish right
from wrong stem from "a defect of reason, from disease of the mind,"
a finding of such disease or defect follows almost automatically when
it is found that a defendant was in such a state that he did not know
the nature, quality, or wrongfulness of his actions. Hence, under
McNaughton, no emphasis need be placed on the medical question of
illness.
McNaughton, therefore, is well adapted for use with the various
rules of a common-law jury trial, outlined in the first section, which ex-
clude or distort information which might be relevant to a psychiatric
finding of illness. As long as the jurors are given a clear picture of
the defendant's conduct at or about the time of the criminal act, they
have enough evidence to determine his responsibity under this test. All
other information is distinctly subordinate to the defendant's actions
when committing the crime. So there are ordinarily no necessary
side-issues to be multiplied, and jury confusion-which confounds both
unanimity and the resolution of all reasonable doubts-may be
minimized.61
60 Knowledge of "wrong" does not require recognition that one's act is illegal.
CARnozo, What Medicine Can Do for Law, in S==ScTED WRITINGS 371, 386 (1947).
61 See Berman, Is It Time to Revise the McNaughton) Rule Relating to the De-
fense of Insanity in, Criminal Law, 29 N.Y. STATE B.A. BLL. 407, 412-14 (1957) ;
Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 325; Moreland, Mental Responsbility and the Criminal
Law-A Defence, 45 Ky. L.J. 215, 219 (1956); Waelder, supra note 53, at 379.
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B. Irresistible Impulse
In the 1830's, the irresistible impulse defense, often known as that
of "temporary insanity," was introduced independently but almost
simultaneously in both England and America. In England its life was
exceedingly short.'3 Two Ohio cases started its American career."
In each the judge charged the jury to look to the defendant's freedom
to act in addition to his ability to tell right from wrong. Thereafter,
acceptance of the irresistible impulse test by the state courts that con-
sidered it was not uncommon; at present, as a supplement to the
McNaughton rules, it appears to be the law in almost a third of the
states."
The irresistible impulse test emphasizes the lack of conscious con-
trol-the inability to govern one's actions.65  Most psychiatrists today
agree that mental illness may generate uncontrollable impulsions; they
think irresistible impulse to be a sound addendum to McNaughton.6
But even this combination draws some psychiatric criticism because
it does not go far enough.
1. Psychiatric Criticisms
The irresistible impulse test deals only with those inexorable
drives that so command the person caught in their grip that he is
powerless to resist them. It does not deal with those subconscious
6 2 In 1840 Lord Chief justice Denman charged the jury in Regina v. Oxford,
9 Car. & P. 525, 546, 175 Eng. Rep. 941, 950 (Nisi Prius 1840), that "if some con-
trolling disease was, in truth, the acting power within him which he could not resist,"
the defendant was not to be held criminally responsible for having fired a pistol at
the Queen. Three years later, however, when the judges of England were consulted
as to the law of insanity in McNaughten's Case, they made no mention of any such
"controlling disease" test, probably because their answers were confined to the ques-
tions put to them in a particular case which concerned a defendant who had committed
a crime by reason of a delusion. GLuECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
236-37 (1925); Keedy, Irresistible Impulse as a Defenme in the Criminal Law, 100
U. PA. L. REv. 956, 959-61 (1952). Irresistible impulse was expressly rejected as
"a most dangerous doctrine" in Regina v. Burton, 3 F. & F. 772, 780, 176 Eng. Rep.
354, 357 (1863), and in 1922 a bill to make it a valid defense, as recommended by the
Lord Chancellor's Committee, failed of passage, see Royal Comm'n Rep. 81.
63 State v. Thompson, Wright 617, 622 (Ohio 1834); Clark v. State, 12 Ohio
483, 494 n. (1843).
64 See MODEL PENAL CODE app. A, at 161 (Tent Draft No. 4, 1955); Keedy,
supra note 62, at 976-85.
6 5 An early and oft-cited formulation of the test is found in Parsons v. State,
81 Ala. 577, 597, 2 So. 854, 866-67 (1887). The court there held a defendant to be
relieved of criminal responsibility:
(1) If, by reason of the duress of . . . mental disease, he has so far lost the
power to choose between the right and wrong, and to avoid doing the act in
question, as that his free agency was at the time destroyed. (2) And if, at
the same time, the alleged crime was so connected with such mental disease,
in the relation of cause and effect, as to have been the product of it solely.
The requirement that the impulse be the sole cause of the act does not exist any
longer in most jurisdictions. See WEIHoFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL
DEFENSE 90-91 (1954).
66 See authorities cited note 46 supra. But see WERTHAm, Tim SHOW OF VIO-
LEN E 13-14 (1949).
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drives which may have the same effect of forcing the actor to do their
bidding, but to which, because he is not consciously aware of them, he
responds in the belief that he is making a free choice. Behaviorists,
who hold that many of our conscious choices are governed by these un-
conscious motivations, urge that the person who commits a crime as a
result of them should not be held criminally accountable. 7 Neither
McNaughton nor irrestistible impulse permits such a result.
Psychiatric thought is also critical of the noun "impulse" in the
title usually given this test. This word suggests that, like a sudden
fall of a triphammer, the drive that has occasioned the wrongful act
has suddenly come and as quickly terminated. But the test is one
that calls for the existence of mental illness, and even psychoses that
may suddenly erupt are the product of preexistent factors and are
never dissipated mere moments after their onslaught. Contemporary
psychiatry knows of no such fleetingly serious mental disease." A
more accurately descriptive title, therefore, might be the "irresistible
urge" or the "brooding propulsion" test.69
2. Practical Value
Apart from these criticisms by psychiatrists, lawyers have ex-
pressed objections to it on practical grounds. Acceptance of the ir-
resistible impulse test seems to stem from the fact that it provides a
convenient formulation which incorporates into the law a sound
psychiatric idea-that man is not always the captain of his fate-,
while presenting jurors with the "out" for which they search in certain
highly charged emotional situations. It gives the "group mind"-the
community mores as expressed through the jurors-a way to give
the defendant a break without, apparently, doing violence to the law."
It is especially useful in homicide cases in which conviction invariably
means lengthy incarceration, if not execution. In such cases it is a
standard ideally suited for use in acquitting the killer who has the
67 See Kaplan, Criminal Responsibility, 45 Ky. L.J. 236, 245, 248-49 (1956);
Karpman, spra note 26; Lukas, A Criminologist Looks at Criminal Guilt, in SocIAL
MEANING OF LEGAL CONCEPTS 113, 143-46 (1950).
68 Cavanagh, A Psychiatrist Looks at the Durham Decision, 5 CATHOLIC U.L.
REV. 25, 42 (1955) ; Zilboorg, A Step Toward Enlightened Justice, 22 U. Cm. L. REV.
331, 333 (1955). See also Davidson, Irresistible Impulse and Criminal Responsibility,
1 J. Fop- Sa. 1, 15-16 (1956).
69 See Cavanagh, supra note 68, at 42-43; De Grazia, The Distinction of Being
Mad, 22 U. CH. L. REv. 339, 342 (1955).
70 See NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMSENT, REPORT ON
CRDIINAL PROCFDURE 36-37 (1931); Comment, Temporary Insanity-Argumentr and
Proposals for Its Elimination as a Defense to Criminal Prosecution, 49 MICH. L. REV.
723, 729 (1951).
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jurors' sympathies, whether he is the mercy killer, the outraged spouse
who kills on finding his mate in flagrante delicto, or the justifiably
aggrieved defendant who kills in the blindness of a righteous
vengeance.
71
Used in this "rough justice" fashion, irresistible impulse offers no
problems for trial juries.
Serious jury problems are created, however, if the irresistible im-
pulse test is viewed as posing a standard each of the elements of which
the jurors are pledged to consider and to evaluate. Those problems
posed for juries by the use of such terms as "mental disease" and
"product," in a proper irresistible impulse charge, will be dealt with
more fully in the following sections of this article, which consider the
Durham and American Law Institute standards. Basic, however, is
the problem of how twelve jurors are to be expected to agree unani-
mously in drawing that exceedingly vague line that separates an act
which is both the product and the principal symptom of a mental illness
from an act produced by a fury or passion that so engulfs a sane man
that he fails to inhibit his actions. In other words, when is the act,
because of illness, irresistible, and when is it simply unresisted? 72
Whether the prosecution or the defendant has the burden of proof can
be decisive.7'
C. The Durham Standard
"It is simply that an accused is not criminally responsible if his
unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect," is the dis-
armingly facile manner in which the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, in 1954, announced the insanity defense standard in
Durham v. United States. 4
Judge Bazelon, speaking for the court, after reversing on the clear
error of the trial court in finding no evidence of insanity at the time of
the crime sufficient to place the burden of proving sanity upon the
government-a burden clearly not met-, 75 went on to consider what
ought to be the proper insanity standard upon retrial."0 After noting
71 See GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 258-59 (1952);
Comment, Recognition of the Honor Defense Under the Insanity Plea, 43 YALE L.J.
809 (1934) ; cf. 29 TEIm. L.Q. 386 (1956).
72 On the difficulty of this question, see Sollars v. State, 73 Nev. 248, 254-55, 316
P.2d 917, 920 (1957) ; Royal Comm'n Rep. 94-96; Floch, The Concept of Temporary
Insanity Viewed by a Criminologist, 45 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 685 (1955); Moreland,
supra note 61, at 220-21.
73 See Commonwealth v. Calhoun, 238 Pa. 474, 484-85, 86 At. 472, 475-76 (1913);
Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264, 267 (1846).
74 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
75Id. at 866-68.
76Id. at 869-76.
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the impossibility of articulating an adequate legal definition of insanity,
the court concluded that it was preferable to supply no definition at all!
The jury should determine the ultimate question of fact as to what con-
stitutes "mental disease or defect" and as to whether the criminal act
was its "product," unrestrained by any further guiding rule of law.
"The question will be," the court said, "simply whether the accused
acted because of a mental disorder, and not whether he displayed par-
ticular symptoms which medical science has long recognized do not
necessarily, or even typically, accompany even the most serious mental
disorder." 77
The effect claimed for the Durham rule is that it permits the law
to grow with scientific advances while remaining immutable in ex-
pression by leaving the question of mental disease to the jury as a
question of fact." In the present age, in which knowledge of some
psychiatric concepts is widely disseminated, the popular appeal of
Durham is obvious. To reject using the latest psychiatric
knowledge in favor of a prepsychiatric, if not prehistoric, standard
would seem reactionary. And yet, despite the hosannas that greeted
Durham,79 it has come under sharp attack in the very court that
enunciated it"0 and has been rejected by every other court that has
considered it during the years since its enunciation." Only one state
77 Id. at 876.
78 See id. at 876.
79 Three Isaac Ray Award books agree in their praises of Durham: BIGGS, THE
GUILTY MIND (1955); ROCHE, THE CRIMINAL MIND (1958); WEIHOFEN, THE URGE
TO PUNISH (1956). Accord, Dession, Psychiatry and Public Policy, 5 BUFFA..O L.
REv. 48, 49 (1955); Douglas, The Durham Rule: A Meeting Ground for Lawyers
and Psychiatrists, 41 IowA L. Rv. 485 (1956) ; Guttmacher, Why Psychiatrists Do
Not Like To Testify it; Court, Prac. Law., May 1955, p. 50, at 56; Overholser, Psy-
chiatry's Contributions to Criminal Law and Procedure, 12 O..A. L. REV. 13, 18
(1959) ; Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal Law: From McNaghten to Durham,
and Beyond, 41 A.B.A.J. 793, 795 (1955).
80 See Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 857-72 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger,
J., concurring).
81 United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 773-74 (3d Cir. 1961) ; Voss v. United
States, 259 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1958); Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1957); Howard v. United States, 232 F.2d 274,
275 (5th Cir. 1956); United States v. Hopkins, 169 F. Supp. 187, 188-91 (D. Md.
1958); United States v. Smith, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 314, 321, 17 C.M.R. 314, 321 (1954),
rev'd on other grounds mb noma. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) ; State v. Crose,
88 Ariz. 389, 394, 357 P.2d 136, 139 (1960) ; Downs v. State, 231 Ark. 466, 468, 330
S.W.2d 281, 283 (1960) ; People v. Nash, 52 Cal. 2d 36, 338 P.2d 416 (1959) ; Castro
v. People, 140 Colo. 493, 508-09, 346 P.2d 1020, 1028-29 (1959) ; State v. Davies, 146
Conn. 137, 145-49, 148 A.2d 251, 255-57, cert. denied, 360 U.S. 921 (1959) ; Longoria
v. State, 168 A.2d 695, 699-701 (Del.), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 368 U.S.
10 (1961) ; Piccott v. State, 116 So. 2d 626, 627 (Fla.), appeal disnissed and cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 293 (1960); People v. Carpenter, 11 Ill. 2d 60, 66-68, 142 N.E.2d
11, 13-15 (1957); Flowers v. State, 236 Ind. 151, 162-66, 139 N.E.2d 185, 192-95
(1957) ; State v. Andrews, 187 Kan. 458, 357 P.2d 739 (1960) ; Thomas v. State, 206
Md. 575, 112 A.2d 913 (1955); Commonwealth v. Chester, 337 Mass. 702, 712-13,
150 N.E.2d 914, 919-20 (1958) ; State v. Finn, 257 Minn. 138, 100 N.W.2d 508 (1960) ;
State v. Goza, 317 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1958) ; Sollars v. State, 73 Nev. 248, 251, 316
P.2d 917, 918-19 (1957) ; State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 67-72, 152 A.2d 50, 66-68 (1959) ;
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legislature, that of Maine, has enacted a version of the Durham rule."
Why has it been so generally rejected?
1. The Function of the Jury
Although Durham was formulated in a case reviewing a convic-
tion by a trial judge sitting without a jury, the need is for a standard
capable of simple expression in a charge orally delivered to a jury of
laymen. How Durham measures up in this regard can best be
evaluated by considering the charge that Judge Bazelon's opinion
suggests.
83
Although McNaughton embraces the concepts of insanity and
causation (it deals with a criminal act that results from a "defect of
reason" arising from "disease of the mind"), it stresses the symptom:
the acts performed by the defendant which are indicative of not know-
ing right from wrong, and so forth. In applying this standard-put-
ting aside, momentarily, considerations as to burden of proof-the jury,
in practice, performs its function in a single step: if the defendant's act
manifests the crucial symptom, a symptom which the lay juror can
recognize without the aid of experts, then, by that fact, the necessary
"disease" is deemed to exist. In contrast, when applying Durham, the
facts which the jurors must find directly, unassisted by court guidance
as to significant symptoms, are those which most laymen are un-
qualified to recognize: the existence of "disease or defect" and whether
or not the criminal act was the disease's "product."
State v. Robinson, 168 N.E.2d 328, 331 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958); Commonwealth v.
Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 164 A.2d 98 (1960); State v. Kirkham, 7 Utah 2d 108, 319
P.2d 859 (1958); State v. Goyet, 120 Vt. 12, 55-61, 132 A.2d 623, 650-54 (1957);
State v. Collins, 50 Wash. 2d 740, 751-55, 314 P.2d 660, 666-68 (1957) ; KIwosek v.
State, 8 Wis. 2d 640, 648-49, 100 N.W.2d 339, 342-43 (1960) ; State v. Kitchens, 129
Mont. 331, 286 P.2d 1079 (1955) (dictum). But cf. Anderson v. Grasberg, 247 Minn.
538, 555, 78 N.W.2d 450, 461 (1956) (husband's right to succeed to wife's share of
their joint tenancy not affected by his having killed her "where his unlawful act was
the product of mental disease").
82 "An accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product
of mental disease or mental defect. The terms 'mental disease' or 'mental defect' do
not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal conduct or excessive
use of drugs or alcohol." MF. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 149, § 38A (Supp. 1961).
83 If you the jury believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not
suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition at the time he com-
mitted the criminal act charged, you may find him guilty. If you believe he
was suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition when he com-
mitted the act, but believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was not
the product of such mental abnormality, you may find him guilty. Unless
you believe beyond a reasonable doubt either that he was not suffering from a
diseased or defective mental condition, or that the act was not the product
of such abnormality, you must find the accused not guilty by reason of in-
sanity. Thus your task would not be completed upon finding, if you did find,
that the accused suffered from a mental disease or defect. He would still
be responsible for his unlawful act if there was no causal connection between
such mental abnormality and the act.
214 F.2d at 875.
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Mental disease or defect is most often unaccompanied by tissue
pathology.' Indeed, the various forms of mental illness are merely
imprecisely defined patterns of nonphysical symptoms one of whose
aspects is false subjective judgments, and a manifestation of which may
be crime." The honest judgments of honest experts will often differ as
to whether the same manifestations constitute a "mental disease or
defect." " Indeed, such classifications as exist are susceptible of over-
night change---and have, on at least one occasion, been so changed
locally-by fiat of a particular institution 7
Nor is the "product" concept entirely clear; the degree of causal
connection between illness and crime necessary to make the latter the
product of the former is uncertain.88 Logically, if the criminal act
would not have taken place but for the disease-if the disease was in
any part a contributing factor in producing the act-then the act may
be said to have been a "product" of the disease. It is absurd to expect
the prosecution to be able to find an honest psychiatrist who can testify
that a defendant's disease in no way contributed to his criminal con-
duct; if a person's acts are the product of his entire personality, no ex-
pert can say that the crime was clearly independent of the alleged
mental disease. 9  And so the seemingly two-pronged Durham ques-
tion-embracing both "disease" and "product"-really boils down to a
single one: whether or not disease was present. If the prosecution has
the burden of proof, any reasonable doubt on this question requires
acquittal.
84 Because "disease!' usually connotes tissue pathology, it has been suggested that
Durham might better be phrased in terms of "mental illness" or "mental disorder."
See Cavanagh, supra note 68, at 27-30.
85 See Szasz, Psychiatry, Ethics, and the Criminal Law, 58 COLUm. L. REv. 183,
190 (1958).
86See works cited note 15 supra. There is considerable uncertainty as to the
borderline between mental disease and mental health. See NoYEs & KOLE, MODERN
CLINICAL PsYcHIATRY 545 (5th ed. 1958); Abrams, Who Is Psychotic?, 4 3. FoR.
Sc. 395, 396-99 (1959); Weihofen, The Definition of Mental Illness, 21 OHmo ST.
L.. 1, 4-6 (1960).
87 In 1957, the Acting Superintendent of St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington,
D.C., announced a revision of the classification pursuant to which staff members had
been testifying that psychopaths or sociopaths were without mental disorder. Such
persons were thereafter to be considered as suffering from a mental disease. See
Jis re Rosenfield, 157 F. Supp 18, 20-21 (D.D.C. 1957), modified, 262 F.2d 34 (D.C.
Cir. 1958) ; Cavanagh, The Responsibility of the Mentally Ill for Criminal Offenses,
4 CATHOLIC LAw. 317, 323 n.20 (1958) ; McGee, Defense Problems Under the Durham
Rule, 5 CATHOLIc LAw. 35, 40-41 (1959); Report of Committee on Criminal Re-
sponsibility of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia, 26 J.B.A.D.C. 301,
306-07 (1959).
88 See Cutler, Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law, 5 CATHOLIC LAW. 44, 50-52
(1959); Gasch, Prosecution Problems Under the Durham Rule, 5 CATHOLIC LAW.
5, 21, 26 (1959); Krash, The Durham Rule and Judicial Administration of the In-
sanity Defense in the District of Columbia, 70 YALE L.J. 905, 929-32 (1961); 54
COLUm. L. Rsv. 1153, 1155 (1954).
89 See RocHE, THE CRImINAL MINl 265 (1958); cf. ABRAHAMSEN, THE Psy-
CHOLOGY OF CRlIE 250 (1960). See also Report of Committee on Crimilal Responsi-
bility, supra note 87, at 302, 307-10.
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If Durham is the standard, experts must be called to provide the
definition of mental illness as well as some guidance concerning the
degree of imbalance necessary to constitute it and to furnish their own
opinions as to whether or not such an illness existed."0 As honest
experts are likely to differ, jurors, who are completely unqualified to
judge scientific opinion, must sit as referees between the experts. Al-
though ostensibly triers of fact, jurors under Durham are thus not
employed to determine a fact, but rather to select standards and
ultimately an opinion from among the conflicting viewpoints embraced
by the experts.91 Although the trappings of the jury system remain,
the true purpose, that of providing a nonprofessional trier of fact, has
gone out of it.
92
The requirement that a criminal jury act on the basis of the
prosecution's proof beyond a reasonable doubt is, in theory, justified by
the fact that a determination of guilt or innocence ordinarily is a deter-
mination of absolutes--either the defendant did or he did not commit
the specific criminal act that has been charged. Although this fact may
be shrouded in doubts because of the insufficiency of credible evidence,
if all possible potential proof were available, its existence or non-
existence could be established with utter certainty. Such certainty be-
ing a theoretical possibility, in order that the individual defendant shall
receive maximum protection our jury system provides that if the
proof falls short of this certainty to an appreciable degree the de-
fendant is not to be convicted.
90 In several District of Columbia cases, the court has reversed convictions be-
cause the prosecution failed to produce any psychiatric expert testimony to meet that
of the defense experts. See, e.g., Fielding v. United States, 251 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir.
1957) ; Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4, 7-10 (D.C. Cir. 1957). In each case,
the Government had relied upon the testimony of police and lay persons as to defend-
ant's conduct, which apparently the jurors found sufficient to convince them of de-
fendant's mental responsibility, despite the contrary testimony of defense experts.
See generally Note, 58 COLUm. L. REv. 1253, 1259-61 (1958).
91 More than a half century ago, Learned Hand, observing that juries are not
competent to resolve conflicts between experts, proposed the use of advisory tribunals
of experts to resolve conflicts and inform the jurors of their decision in much the
manner in which a judge charges a jury on the law. Hand, Historical and Practical
Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HAj~v. L. Rxv. 40, 50-58 (1901).
The impact of the Durham rule in similarly transferring to the experts the deter-
mination of the ultimate fact question has elsewhere been noted. See Morris, Criminal
Insanity: The Abyss Between Law and Psychiatry, 12 REcORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 471,
490-91 (1957).
9
2 
It is no answer to note that expert opinions are frequently relied upon in jury
trials. Civil cases afford a poor analogy. A jury verdict in a civil case-usually
rendered in terms of dollars-may represent a compromise between jurors divided in
their evaluation of the experts' testimony. Not only do such compromises represent
violations of jurors' oaths, but they have no place in a criminal court where the
verdict is "guilty" or "not guilty." Moreover, in civil cases proof need not be beyond
a reasonable doubt. In criminal cases, the testimony of fingerprint and handwriting
experts on questions of identification, chemical experts concerning narcotic drugs, etc.,
unlike that of psychiatrists testifying under the Durham rule, is not to provide opinions
on the ultimate question of guilt. Moreover, the areas for expert testimony in criminal
cases are, by and large, areas in which honest and equally qualified experts relying
on the same hypotheses could reasonably be expected to come up with the same opinion.
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In cases in which the ultimate problem for the jurors is not one
of determining whether a theoretically ascertainable fact exists, where
they are asked to adopt opinions as to whether certain facts shall be
deemed sufficient to constitute illness causative of the crime, concepts
of unanimity and proof beyond a reasonable doubt lack even theoretical
merit
. 3
This does not mean, of course, that jurors with Durham as their
standard never reach a verdict of guilty. It simply means that, in
theory, in most litigated cases, they should not." As long as the law
does not prescribe standards for mental responsibility and as long as
there is some conflict between honest experts entertaining differing
theories, how can laymen be presumptuous enough to reject unani-
mously the views of any expert as not being "reasonable"? The
answer is, of course, that theory and practice are often two different
things. Jurors are answerable to no one, and so they can be just this
presumptuous. They can ignore all of the expert testimony and bring
in a visceral verdict. 5 They can listen to all of the testimony and be
so taken in or confused by the forensic skill of one psychiatrist that
they may discount the learning offered by the other.96 But it hardly
weighs in favor of a rule, especially one that claims acceptance for its
incorporation of modern science into the law, to urge that the triers
of fact may violate their obligation to accept the law as given them by
the court and disregard the rules that they are informed are to govern
their deliberations.
In fact, under Durham, acquittals have increased somewhat.
7
Their likelihood, or that of hung juries, would seem to reflect the
degree of conscientiousness on the part of the jurors. Reversals of
93Although psychiatrists have long insisted on the jury's unfitness to determine
questions of sanity, see OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW 79 (1953);
RAY, THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY § 46 (5th ed. 1871), some writers
have suggested that the jury's capacity to handle such an imprecise concept as "rea-
sonable man" demonstrates its ability to decide issues of sanity, Report of Committee
on Criminal Responsibility, mipra note 87, at 325 (memorandum of dissent); Note,
29 TE P. L.Q. 338, 244 (1956). The analogy is unsound. The concept of the "rea-
sonable man" deals with the normal, everyday experiences with which the average
juror is familiar and as to which most jurors will usually be found to agree. Not so
in the area of the abnormal, where laymen are, by definition, inexperienced--especially
in the area of the abnormal processes that constitute mental illness, where the jury
will often find division in the opinions of those who are qualified to inform them.
Unfamiliarity and disagreement as to an imprecise concept are most disruptive in a
criminal trial. Cf. note 92 supra.
94 See Gasch, supra note 88, at 33.
95 See Royal Comm'n Rep. 82, 84, 85, 102.
96 See OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAw 109-10 (1953) ; Weihofen,
Eliminating the Battle of Experts in Criminal Iisanity Cases, 48 MICH. L. REv. 961,
962 (1950).
97 See Clayton, Six Years After Durham, 44 J. Am. J u. Soc'Y 18, 19-20 (1960);
Gasch, supra note 88, at 31; Krash, supra note 88, at 948-50; Note, 58 COL. L. Rxv.
1253, 1266 (1958).
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convictions have been frequent, the appellate court recognizing that a
conviction may sometimes indicate jury disregard of the expert testi-
mony. 8  In the Durham court, the danger of dishonest witnesses ap-
pearing on behalf of neurotic malingerers is minimized because the
federal rule permitting judicial comment on credibility 11 allows the
trial judge who recognizes a professional mountebank to advise the
jury on the weight to be given his testimony.
Under Durham, the experts rule the witness box to the extent of
being permitted to testify in terms which their professional training
qualifies them to use.'H This should render them more at ease and
theoretically more valuable in the courtroom. The lay juror, however,
unschooled in science, may experience some difficulty in following and
absorbing the short course in psychiatry that will be conducted by
means of a dialogue between lawyer adversaries and the experts. The
potential for confusion is considerable where twelve persons must listen
to highly technical testimony for days on end, largely without asking
questions or discussing the testimony among themselves during that
period.'" And such confusion, it has been pointed out, increases the
likelihood of disagreement or the uncertain feeling that nothing has
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Finally, even in the face of unanimous testimony on the part of
the expert witnesses that the defendant was not suffering from a mental
disease or defect, proof that he committed a particularly heinous crime
is, of itself, likely to plant in the lay mind, which is apt to equate aber-
rance with insanity,0 2 the seed of a "sound reason to believe" that the
crime was the product of that mental illness which Durham inten-
tionally leaves undefined.
2. Evidential Problems
In the Durham case, the court of appeals relied on the testimony of
the defendant's mother that the defendant had hallucinated on occa-
98 See, e.g., Fielding v. United States, 251 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Wright v.
United States, 250 F.2d 4, 10 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Douglas v. United States, 239 F.2d
52, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1956); cf. Commonwealth v. Cox, 327 Mass. 609, 100 N.E.2d 14
(1951). See also Gasch, supra note 88, at 31.
99 Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933).
10 See Douglas, supra note 79, at 488; Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an Ex-
pert Witness, 22 U. CH. L. REv. 325, 329 (1954).
10 See, e.g., N.Y. CODE CarM. PROC. § 415: "The jury must also, at each adjourn-
ment . . . be admonished by the court, that it is their duty not to converse among
themselves on any subject connected with the trial, or to form or express any opinion
thereon, until the cause is finally submitted to them."
102 "To the jury nothing is more obvious than that a psychopath is a refugee from
a psychopathic ward and is therefore insane." Davidson, Psychiatrists in Administra-
tion of Criminal T ustice, 45 J. CRmn. L., C. & P.S. 12, 16 (1954).
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sions during the months preceding his crime. 3  This testimony is a
mere teaser compared to the manner in which the Durham standard,
by stressing otherwise undefined "mental illness," may authorize re-
liance on events which are remote in time, place, and subject matter
from the crime charged. Under McNaughton, the jurors concentrate
on the defendant's actions at the time of the crime. But when, as
under the Durham and the American Law Institute standards, "mental
illness" is the key, conduct of a defendant months or years before the
crime may be even more important than eyewitness testimony about
the crime itself, and the witnesses to such noncontemporary conduct
are likely to be the defendant's family or old friends.3 4 All of the
problems enumerated in the first part of this article-problems that
stress the incompatibility between today's science of psychiatry and our
common-law criminal jury trial-are accentuated under the Durham
standard.
3. Post-Acquittal Problems
Although Durham may be successful in saving from criminal
conviction some psychotics who might not fare as well under the older
insanity standards (and may have the questionably desirable side-
effect of saving psychopaths and neurotics), whether this result is more
enlightened from the viewpoint of the individual defendant, and better
protective of his rights, is subject to debate.
The District of Columbia reacted speedily to the Durham case;
Congress promptly provided for the commitment and detention of each
person acquitted as insane until it is found that he "will not in the
reasonable future be dangerous to himself or to others . "...05
Such legislation is the expected result of any standard that increases
the rate of acquittal of persons who, although technically sane enough
to stand trial (and, hence, in all probability, not subject to indefinite
commitment as insane), are of such mental instability that their relapse
is a real and substantial possibility.0"
103 214 F2d at 864.
104 See Gasch, .ipra note 88, at 19-21.
105 D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(c) (3) (Supp 1960), Overholser v. Leach, 257
F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959) ; see Goldstein & Katz,
Dangerotsuess and Mental Illness, Some Observations of the Decision To Release
Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225 (1960); Krash, supra
note 88, at 926-27, 940-48; Note, 68 YAI L.J. 293 (1958) ; Note, 44 GEo. L.J. 489,
502-05 (1956). The commitment standard established by this statute is limited to the
District of Columbia. In rejecting Durham, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit noted that the choice it faced was not between confinement and commitment
(as it now is in the District), but between confinement and freedom. Sauer v. United
States, 241 F.2d 640, 650-51 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1957).
108 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08 & comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) ; N.Y.
Conference Rep. 14-18. Some question has been raised, however, as to the constitu-
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A defendant whose legal insanity has spared him execution for
a capital crime is, in the eyes of our community, better off committed
than dead. But if commitment is the inevitable result of acquittal by
reason of insanity, the accused whose criminal sentence would have
been limited to a stated number of years may often expect to spend
the rest of his life as an institutional inmate.0 7 No right of appeal
exists from the acquittal that led to his commitment. The length of
his incarceration is, at least in the first instance, wholly within the
control of administrative personnel acting pursuant to medical stand-
ards, not of courts guided by principles of law.
Whether commitment or imprisonment is more desirable during
its duration from the standpoint of the defendant will depend upon the
adequacy of the psychiatric personnel available, the nature of the
medical treatment and rehabilitation programs, the extent of crowding
of the facilities, and the character of other members of the institutional
population."08
D. The American Law Institute Proposal
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct
if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law.
(2) The terms "mental disease or defect" do not in-
clude an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise anti-social conduct.' 09
This test for criminal insanity, suggested in a tentative draft of
the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code in 1955, has not
tionality of such commitment statutes. See Goldstein & Katz, supra note 105, at
238-39; McGee, supra note 87, at 39. Frank S. Hogan, New York County District
Attorney, wrote to Dr. Paul H. Hoch, New York State Commissioner of Mental
Hygiene, on July 28, 1959, that "where such release hinges not on the person's own
welfare, but on the informed speculation of psychiatric experts (of various schools
of thought) as to whether his freedom may in the future represent any danger to
others, there is certainly the possibility of such legislation either being stricken down
as violative of due process, or being most narrowly construed." The constitutionality
of the District of Columbia's commitment statute has been sustained. Ragsdale v.
Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1960). A new statute in New York, N.Y.
CODE CRIM. PRoC. § 454, enacted in 1960, providing for the commitment of defendants
acquitted by reason of insanity as long as they remain dangerous to themselves or
others, has not been tested in the New York appellate courts as of this writing.
107 See Halleck, The Insanity Defense in the District of Columbia-A Legal
Lorelei, 49 GEo. L.J. 294 (1960); Szasz, Hospital Refusal to Release Mental Patient,
9 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 220 (1960); cf. Note, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 78, 98 (1961).
108 See ROCHE, THE CRIMINAL MIND 240-41 (1958) ; De Grazia, The Distinction
of Being Mad, 22 U. Cxi. L. REv. 339, 348-55 (1954) ; McGee, supra note 87, at 39.
See generally Guttentag, Prison vs. Closed Ward, Their Philosophical Relationship,
45 Ky. L.J. 251 (1956).
109 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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experienced the warm reception that might have been anticipated for
it as a consequence of the earlier lack of a satisfactory standard and
of the caliber of the experts who gathered, via the Institute, deter-
mined to fill this void. In the seven years since its publication, only
one federal circuit, the Third,1 ' and two states, Vermont,"' and
Illinois,"' have adopted it--each in somewhat altered form."'
The Institute standard seeks to combine facets of the rules previ-
ously considered. It is suggestive of Durham in the emphasis it places
on the diagnosis of "mental disease or defect"; in language it is some-
what reminiscent of McNaughtonr ("capacity . . . to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct"); and it embraces an improved irresistible
impulse test ("capacity . . . to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of the law"). By this combination it overcomes McNaughton's
narrow emphasis on cognition, while eliminating the psychiatrically
unsound stress on momentary or sudden compulsion associated with
irresistible impulse. It seeks to give jurors more guidance than they
receive from the brief Durham standard by limiting the defense of in-
sanity so as to require something more than the existence of that
vague affliction called "mental disease or defect."
1. Imprecision of the ALI Standard
The Institute's draftsmen have hedged the conditions under which
mental disorders exculpate by using words of degree--"substantial
capacity" and "appreciate." But they have not defined what degrees
these words entail. Unlike the word "know," as used in McNaughton,
which has a common, absolute meaning (at least to laymen), these
110 United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 1961) : "The jury must
be satisfied that at the time of committing the prohibited act the defendant, as a result
of mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law which he is alleged to have violated."
"' VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4801 (1958). Vermont substitutes "adequate capac-
ity" for "substantial capacity" in the first sentence of the ALI formulation, and adds
the following language after the second sentence: "The terms 'mental disease or defect'
shall include congenital and traumatic mental conditions as well as disease."
1 12 ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2 (Smith-Hurd 1961). This version substitutes
"criminally responsible for conduct" for the ALI's "responsible for criminal conduct,"
and "mental disease or mental defect" for the ALI's "mental disease or defect."
113 The N.Y. Conference Rep. 7 suggests the adoption of the ALT standard in
New York with very minor changes in wording. In order to emphasize that "appre-
ciate!' means more than "know" as used in McNaughton, the New York group sug-
gests that "substantial capacity . . . to know or to appreciate" be substituted for
"substantial capacity . . . to appreciate," and that "criminality of his conduct,"
which might possibly embrace overly nice legal technicalities, be replaced by "wrong-
fulness of his conduct."
Efforts to introduce the ALI standard in the District of Columbia, replacing
Durham, have so far been unsuccessful. See Note, 58 CoLum. L. Rv. 1253, 1265
(1958). But on June 26, 1961, the House of Representatives, without debate, passed
a bill that would effect this change, H.R. 7052, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). No
action has been taken by the Senate.
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words were intentionally chosen for their imprecision." The diffi-
culty is that they encourage differences among expert witnesses not
over whether the defendant's capacity was impaired but over whether
the degree of impairment observed should be deemed "substantial" and
over the depths of awareness that must exist before one may be deemed
to "appreciate" the criminality of his conduct. Jurors too have their
own notions about what these words mean and may often disagree
among themselves not because they see the "facts" differently, but
because they have no common understanding of the categories into
which they must fit those facts.
Ordinarily, this kind of danger is minimized by proper instruc-
tions from the bench. But how is a judge to charge a jury under the
ALI rule? He could state that "substantial capacity" and "appreciate"
were to be defined by reference to the jurors' own beliefs as to whether
the defendant's capacity was such that he ought to be held re-
sponsible." 5 If this is to be the charge, it would encourage jurors, in
reaching the verdict, to let their own moral or emotional judgments
cut across both the testimony of the experts and the other court-given
rules of law. On the other hand, any charge that tries to define these
words more precisely than their inherently elusive character permits
would negate the very elasticity that the ALI draftsmen meant the
words to incorporate.
By its introduction of undefined concepts of degree, the Institute
standard is less easily followed by jurors than either McNaughton or
Durham."6 Ordinarily, vagueness of standards is not desirable in a
114 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, comment at 158-59 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955),
notes:
The draft, accordingly, does not demand complete impairment of capacity.
It asks instead for substantial impairment. . . . If substantial impair-
ment of capacity is to suffice, there remains the question whether this alone
should be the test or whether the criterion should state the principle that
measures how substantial it must be. To identify the degrees of impairment
with precision is, of course, impossible both verbally and logically. The recom-
mended formulation is content to rest upon the term "substantial" to support
the weight of judgment; if capacity is greatly impaired, that presumably
should be sufficient.
115 See note 117 infra.
"16 McNaughton is narrowly limited: it only excuses persons whose illness is
so severe that they do not know what they are doing. Durham is extremely broad:
if conscientiously followed, it would excuse all persons whose criminal acts were,
even in part, the result of any mental illness. Somewhere in between are the irre-
sistible impulse test and the American Law Institute proposal; each poses a standard
inherently so flexible that jurors can-within broad limits-adapt it to excuse which-
soever defendants they choose, without doing either any violence.
The chief Reporter and principal draftsman of the Model Penal Code has criti-
cized the Durham rule for its ambiguity. See Wechsler, The Criteria of Criminal
Responsibility, 22 U. CHL. L. REv. 367 (1955). Ambiguity, however, should not be
confused with breadth of application. It is submitted that although Durham is broader
and would, in all probability, excuse more persons than the ALI proposal, the latter
engrafts further ambiguities on those already contained in Durham and in fact offers
conscientious jurors less guidance.
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criminal trial, where jurors must be unanimous and proof must be
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Under the ALI rule, jurors do not perform their traditional func-
tion of finding facts, nor do they-as under Durham-merely choose
from among conflicting experts' opinions. Rather, they engage in a
two-stage endeavor: first, as under Durham, they must choose an opin-
ion; second, if the opinion that they adopt is that the defendant was
mentally ill, then they must exercise their own moral or emotional
choice as to whether or not the degree was such that they believe that
he ought to be held criminally responsible. (Indeed, the Institute's
draftsmen have gone so far as to suggest an alternative proposal which
is in other respects similar to the standard here considered except that
it expressly permits the jurors to do what they deem "just." 117)
2. Elimination of Psychopathy as a Defense
In considering Durham it was noted that a reputable school of
psychiatrists considers most antisocial acts to be symptomatic of mental
disease or defect and that since under Durham mental disease or defect
excuses from criminal responsibility, in most cases at least a sound
ground exists for a juror's reasonable doubt as to almost any de-
fendant's legal sanity.' The Institute formulation has tried to avoid
this theoretical justification for wholesale acquittals by providing that
"the terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct."
But this proviso may be the source of great difficulties.
Not only is it unlikely that any psychiatrist would base his diag-
nosis of the criminal psychopath-the intended object of the ALI pro-
viso-solely on criminal or antisocial conduct," 9 but, even in the face
of such diagnosis, the proviso might be ineffective both because it
would be impossible for the defense of insanity, supported largely by
evidence of prior crimes, to be denied as a matter of law, 20 and be-
117 The alternative rewrites the end of the first sentence, quoted above, to read:
"if . . . his capacity . . . is so substantially impaired that he cannot justly be
held responsible.' MoDEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, alternative (a) (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955). Similarly, the Royal Comm'n Rep. 116 recommends a standard that would
"leave the jury to determine whether at the time of the act the accused was suffering
from disease of the mind (or mental deficiency) to such a degree that he alght not
to be held responsible." (Emphasis added.) See also Wechsler, supra note 116,
at 372.
118 See pp. 790-94 supra.
119 Kozol, The Psychopath Before the Law, Mass. L.Q., July 1959, p. 106, at
116 (1959). With this knowledge, any reasonably skillful defense attorney, function-
ing under the ALI rule, would be certain to elicit--quite possibly on cross-examination
of the prosecution's own witnesses-some evidence of the defendant's abnormality
other than his criminal or antisocial acts.
120The possibility of jury confusion is great. The difference between mental
disease and psychopathy-if any-is not simple. In Stewart v. United States, 214
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cause the prosecutor's invocation of the proviso with an offer to prove
a history of similar prior crimes would be met with a probably effective
objection that the evidence was inadmissible because of its prejudicial
effect. 2 1
Finally, it seems unsound to freeze the intention of the proviso
into law. Although psychopaths are generally not deterrable,- some
slight headway is being made in rehabilitation by means of psychiatric
therapy," 3 and further progress-including a possible breakthrough in
treatment of psychopathy-are possible.
3. Other Provisions of the ALI Code
The standard for the defense of insanity is only one facet of the
American Law Institute's fairly comprehensive approach to the prob-
lems presented by this defense. The Institute has also considered the
assertion of insanity in support of diminished responsibility, the neces-
sity of pleading insanity, mandatory examination of defendants by
court appointed psychiatrists and the nature of their reports, the power
of the court to direct an acquittal by reason of insanity, limitations on
privately engaged experts, and commitment of acquitted but dangerous
defendants.' Some of the provisions of the Code which tend to make
its insanity standard more compatible with our jury system will be
considered in the next section of this article. It is submitted, however,
that the language of the Institute's proposal is so fraught with impre-
cision and the likelihood of juror disagreement if conscientiously fol-
lowed that no harmonious marriage between it and our jury system of
F.2d 879, 881-82 (D.C. Cir. 1954), decided two weeks after Durham, the trial judge
had tried in his charge to distinguish psychopathy from mental disease. The difficulty
he experienced in the attempt was one of the reasons the conviction was reversed.
In People v. Horton, 308 N.Y. 1, 123 N.E2d 609 (1954), the defendant's conviction
for murdering his father was affirmed. The state's experts had testified that he
was not psychotic at the time of the killing, but that he was a "psychopathic person-
ality." Commenting on the insanity defense, judge Van Voorhis, a distinguished
jurist who later served on the Governor's Subcommittee on the Defense of Insanity,
relied on these experts to conclude that "their testimony indicates the probability of
mental disease." Id. at 17-18, 123 N.E.2d at 617 (dissenting opinion). Psychiatrists
find the distinction between mental health and mental illness no easier to draw. See
authorities cited notes 15, 86 supra.
121 See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
122 See CLERKLEY, THE MASK OF SANITY (3d ed. 1955), the leading work dealing
with the so-called psychopathic personality; ABRAHAMSEN, WHO ARE THE GUn.TY?
154-64 (1952); HENDERSON & GILLESPIE, PSYCHIATRY FOR STUDENTS AND PRACTI-
TIONERS 384-402 (8th ed. 1956); NoYEs & KOLB, op. cit. supra note 86, at 545-63;
Note, 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 425 (1955).
123 See CLERKLEY, THE: MASK OF SANITY 535-38 (3d ed. 1955); HENDERSON &
GILLESPIE, op. cit. supra note 122, at 403-34; Biggs, Procedures for Handling the
Mentally-Ill Offender in Some European Countries, 29 TEmp. L.Q. 254 (1956);
Lipton, The Psychopath, 40 J. Crim. L. & C. 584 (1950); Ross, Some Implications
and Results of the Psychiatric Treatment of Inmates, 1 J. FOR. Sci. 117 (1956).
124 See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 4.02-.09 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). See generally
WEIHoFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH 102-29 (1956).
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trial can be anticipated as long as the prosecution has the burden of
proving criminal responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt to a unani-
mous jury.
III. A PROPOSED PSYCHIATRIC OFFENDER LAW
The criticisms of existing and proposed standards of criminal
responsibility made in the preceding portion of this article have assumed
that: (1) if conduct which would otherwise be criminal has resulted
from mental illness, the actor should be spared criminal conviction;
(2) the standard for determining whether the conduct was the result
of mental disorder should be designed to work within the system of
factfinding in which it is invoked; (3) if a defendant is seriously dis-
turbed, although he may be spared criminal conviction, there should be
procedures for quarantining him from the community in order to pro-
tect the community; and (4) a defendant should not be dealt with
more harshly in regard to the duration of his institutional commitment
because of his assertion of the insanity defense than he would be if he
had failed to assert it.
Although current psychiatric learning indicates that an appreciable
amount of antisocial conduct is caused by mental imbalance, illness, or
defects, our methods of criminal law enforcement have not adjusted,
generally, to make effective use of this knowledge. In some areas of
law enforcement, however, as certain cohesive areas of antisocial ac-
tivity have been isolated, traditional methods of criminal law have
yielded to newly devised approaches to the particular problems. Thus,
children of tender years are no longer held criminally responsible.
Their difficulties are considered in special children's courts where the
procedures are not adversary, are likely to be highly informal, do not
use juries, and have as their goal the reclamation of the youngsters." 5
Special procedures for dealing with adult "sexual psychopaths" have
been attempted, although without marked success." 6 If the various
rules for the insanity defense have not succeeded in reconciling law and
psychiatry in the jury trial forum, should not a new and bolder ap-
proach that goes beyond simply rewriting the insanity "standard" be
tried?
To this end, a "Psychiatric Offender Law" 17 will be proposed
and examined in this section. The proposal would establish a suffi-
125 See Lu wIG, YouT AND THE LAW 37-130 (1955).
126 See Swanson, Sexual Psychopath Statutes: Summary and Analysis, 51 J.
Cam. L., C. & P.S. 215 (1960). See also Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate
Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940) (sustaining constitutionality).
127 There is no magic in the suggested title. It is proposed, with full cognizance
of its ambiguity, as being preferable to a title that might more pointedly suggest
mental illness. The title given to the procedure and to the persons whose conduct
is evaluated pursuant to this procedure is of minimal importance.
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ciently flexible method to permit the fullest consideration of a de-
fendant's mental condition and the impact of any illness on the criminal
act he is charged with having committed. It would afford to de-
fendants who wished them the full benefits of up-to-date psychiatric
opinions. A defendant seeking these benefits would waive the right
to a jury trial and the physician-patient privilege, and would agree to
institutional commitment for observation and full psychiatric
examination.2n
Specific language for a model statute is not suggested. Rather,
an attempt is made to evolve some of the principles and to point out
some of the problems that draftsmen will ultimately have to consider
if the method outlined should meet with favor.
A. Procedure
1. Election of Psychiatric Offender Consideration
The new statute would first come into play after a defendant had
been arrested for a crime and had consulted with counsel. At that
time, or within a limited period thereafter,"2 any defendant 30 would
have the right to elect to be considered for psychiatric offender treat-
ment. The right to such consideration would rest wholly with the
defendant; no extensive prior criminal record, no prosecutor's objec-
tion, and no court reluctance would be allowed to deny this. (Whether,
however, after such consideration had been given, the defendant would
in fact be adjudicated a psychiatric offender, or alternatively would be
convicted or acquitted of crime, would depend upon factors considered
hereinafter.) The defendant's formal election, on the advice of coun-
sel, to be considered for psychiatric offender treatment would consti-
128 As to the defendant who fails to elect psychiatric offender treatment, see
pp. 812-13 infra.
129 It seems desirable to require reasonable promptness for several reasons: it
would reduce the likelihood of malingering or of the development of any genuine
reactive psychosis between the time of apprehension and examination; it would
increase the likelihood of accuracy in the diagnosis of the defendant's mental condition
as of the time of the crime; and it would minimize the use of the Psychiatric Offender
Law for purposes of delay. Of course, if, at the time of arrest, the defendant is so
disturbed that he cannot make an intelligent choice whether to request psychiatric
offender consideration, he would not thereafter be barred from this election when he
recovered his capacity to make it. If the defendant elects psychiatric offender con-
sideration after arrest but before a formal charge-indictment or information-has
been returned, the promptness of the defendant's choice should not prevent the prose-
cution from completing the formalities necessary to charge crime. They would
probably be a prerequisite if the court should ultimately reject the defendant's prayer
for psychiatric offender adjudication and convict him of crime.
130 In order to avoid strain on available facilities, which would have to be de-
veloped over time, it might be desirable initially to limit the application of the Psy-
chiatric Offender Law to persons charged with felonies. The goal, however, should
be to include all crimes. Often, minor offenses, such as indecent exposure, shop-
lifting, and various acts of sexual dalliance with children, are symptomatic of deep-
seated mental disturbance.
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tute a waiver of trial by jury and of the physician-patient privilege
insofar as that privilege pertained to any data that might shed light on
the defendant's mental condition. It would also constitute a waiver
of the privilege against self-incrimination to the extent of constituting
a consent to testifying in court in the psychiatric offender proceeding,
and to submitting to institutional commitment for a complete psychi-
atric examination. The results of such mental examination, however,
would be admissible only in the psychiatric offender proceeding, and
there only on the question of the defendant's mental condition and
appropriate treatment; they would not be admissible on the question of
whether or not the defendant had committed the illegal act.
2. Psychiatric Examination
Upon the defendant's election of psychiatric offender treatment,
the court would be required to commit him for mental observation.
3 1
The circumstances of the commitment should be such that if the insti-
tutional psychiatrists were not satisfactory to either the defense or the
prosecution, either side would have the right to produce at least one
psychiatrist who would have a full opportunity to examine the defend-
ant during the course of his commitment and to consult with the other
examining psychiatrists.3 2 If the court should learn that the defendant
had previously undergone other mental examinations-and question-
ing the defendant for this purpose would be appropriate--whether they
131 With the consent of all the parties, commitment might be dispensed with.
This might be appropriate in cases of defendants whose apparent mental imbalance
led to prompt commitment on arrest and concerning whom full psychiatric reports are
available to the court, without the need for any fresh workup. In such cases, the
court should have the authority to order whatever further investigation seems neces-
sary, but it would seem futile to require a full commitment and examination.
132 Provision for privately retained psychiatrists in a proceeding that is not ad-
versary in nature but is designed to give the court the maximum amount of informa-
tion is important. The pressures created by volume at public institutions, sometimes
coupled with inexpertise because of poor pay, may render reports by so-called "court
psychiatrists" inadequate. See Cohen, Sears & Ewalt, Observations on the Chapin
Case and "The Briggs Law," Mass. L.Q., Dec. 1956, p. 30; Karpman, On Reducing
Tensions and Bridging Gaps Between Psychiatry and the Law, 48 J. CRaM. L., C. &
P.S. 164, 171-72 (1957) ; Note, Psychiatric Cmrt Clinics, 29 TEmP. L.Q. 347, 358-59
(1956). Moreover, in view of the many divergent schools of psychiatric thought,
any particular "court psychiatrist"'-in expressing his own opinions, shaped by his
particular discipline and prejudices-may express a view sharply at variance with the
view others might entertain with equal honesty. See Davidson, supra note 102, at
14. In instances in which "court psychiatrists" are used, and a jury is the trier of
fact, these defects may have particular impact, as jurors tend to accept without criti-
cism the views of the court-appointed expert whose mode of appointment tends to
label him "impartial." See Kreutzer, Re-Examination of the Briggs Law, 39 B.U.L.
REv. 188, 193-94 (1959); Weihofen, Crime, Law, and Psychiatry, 4 KAm. L. REv.
377, 382-83 (1956). But with a judge as trier of fact, as this psychiatric offender
plan contemplates, such labels should be of less significance. Possibly to assure the
legitimacy of privately employed psychiatrists, there should be some minimal stand-
ards; one writer considering the question of psychiatric testimony has suggested
a statutory requirement that experts be Diplomates of the American Board of Psy-
chiatry and Neurology. Kreutzer, supra at 196.
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had been conducted at public institutions or privately, it would sub-
poena the records of those examinations and make them available to
all the examining psychiatrists. Similarly, the defendant would be
fingerprinted in order that his full criminal history might be obtained
and made available. Access would be given the psychiatrists to ad-
judications of juvenile delinquency and of youth crime, although
normally state law might render them unavailable.'
3
3. Psychiatric Report
The examining psychiatrists would be encouraged to confer to-
gether, and, if feasible, to agree upon a single comprehensive written
report to the court. This report would evaluate the defendant's mental
condition at the time of the examinations and-separately-at the time
of the crime with which he was charged. It would also consider, as
far as scientific knowledge permitted, the impact of that condition upon
the defendant's allegedly criminal conduct. In cases in which the
examining psychiatrists perceived some mental abnormality to exist at
the time of their examinations, their report would evaluate its effect on
the defendant's ability to have intelligently elected psychiatric offender
consideration. It would also contain the experts' recommendations for
treatment of the defendant and their prognosis for the future should
their treatment recommendations be followed. In cases in which agree-
ment among the psychiatrists was not possible, separate written re-
ports would be submitted to the court.
4. Preliminary Matters for the Court
Equipped with the psychiatrists' reports, the court would proceed
to dispose of the charge. If the experts found present mental illness,
the court would have to determine whether the defendant had had the
capacity intelligently to choose psychiatric offender treatment. Testi-
mony could be taken to assist the court in resolving this question. The
proceedings would be similar to those now used to determine a de-
fendant's ability to stand trial.
If the defendant's election is found to have been understandingly
made, he would be permitted to concede having committed the wrong-
ful act, and thus to dispose of that question.-"4 When the psychiatrists
133 See, e.g., N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 913-o.
134 In most instances in which the insanity defense is asserted, there is little
contest by the defendant concerning the unlawful act. Yet under present jury trial
methods, the prosecution must prove these facts. This can be purposeless and time
consuming. There can be no simple quid pro quo to encourage defendants to concede
these facts. However, since psychiatric offender proceedings would not be strictly
adversary in nature, but should be a joint effort by the court, defense counsel, and
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were in agreement as to their report, the court would then either ad-
judge the defendant a psychiatric offender or reject the claim of mental
illness as the foundation for the wrongful act and convict the defendant
of crime. But if there was no concession as to the criminal act, the
psychiatrists disagreed, or their reports were inconclusive, then the
court would order a trial of these issues before it.
5. Admissibility of Evidence
In such a trial, the examining psychiatrists would be subject to
call and to examination by both defense and prosecution counsel and
by the court; possibly they might be permitted to put questions to
each other. Great latitude would govern the admission of evidence.
Objections to hearsay testimony that provided information about the
defendant's background-information relevant for diagnostic pur-
poses-would not go to admissibility, but would merely affect the
weight the court would give it. Medical opinions contained in hos-
pital reports of prior examinations of the defendant would be accept-
able under similar limitations. Evidence of prior convictions or of
prior criminal acts that might bear on the defendant's mental health
would be admitted. Since the conclusions of the experts would have
been based on their inspections of other hospital reports, on the
"histories" they would have received, and on their own personal ex-
aminations of the defendant, hypothetical questions should be largely
unnecessary.3 5 Insofar as they might be used, however, the hy-
potheses should be the result of agreement between the parties-with
the court as arbiter if needed-so that all expert opinions would have
common factual starting points. The defendant's election of psychi-
atric offender consideration having constituted his consent to testifying
in that proceeding, court and counsel would have the right to put ques-
tions to him unless there was psychiatric agreement that the question-
ing might seriously impede the defendant's recovery.
the prosecutor to get at the roots of particular conduct in an effort to cure and to
rehabilitate, whether or not a defendant conceded the facts of his antisocial act might
be one element considered by the court in evaluating the bona fides of the claim of
mental illness. The concession of such illegal conduct would not, of course, preclude
such proof as might be needful to give the court some picture of the defendant's
apparent mental state at the time of his actions.
135 The Model Penal Code provides for court-appointed examiners of the defend-
ant who asserts an insanity defense, reports by such persons, and optional examination
and report by psychiatrists of the defendant's own choosing. See MoDEL PENA. CoDE
§§ 4.05, 4.07 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). The comment, id. at 198, notes that the Code
proposal to bar expert opinion from persons other than those who have examined
the defendant "prevents what may be regarded as the least defensible use of the
hypothetical question-testimony by an expert who has not examined the defendant
as to a diagnosis of the defendant's mental condition and perhaps as to his responsibility,
based solely upon a hypothetical statement of facts and alternatively also upon his
observation of the defendant in court."
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In summary, the procedure would be an effort to get at the
truth, uninhibited by much of the formalism that applies in jury trials.
It would be held in loose rein by the fact that presiding-and sitting as
judge of both fact and law-would be an arbiter whose discipline in
the law made him mindful of the weaknesses likely to exist in testi-
mony that would, in a common-law trial, be excluded pursuant to valid
and timely objections.'
6. Roles of the Judge and the Experts
The responsibility for making the decision of acquittal, criminal
conviction, or adjudication as a psychiatric offender would be solely
the court's and would not be shared by the psychiatrists. Placing this
responsibility on the judge seems desirable for several reasons. Not
only do his training and background render him particularly perceptive
in evaluating testimony, but the act which gave rise to the proceeding
was an affront to the laws which he is charged with administering. As
long as uncertainty and dissension persist in the science of psychiatry,
the continued use of our traditional judicial arbiter, hopefully objec-
tive, seems desirable.
Notwithstanding its ultimate responsibility, the court would be
allowed to rely heavily upon the assistance of experts. Off-the-record
consultation between the court and the psychiatric witness might even
be expressly made proper. After the close of the evidence and such
informal consultation, the court might reopen the hearing, if need be,
to admit such further expert testimony as these informal discussions
indicated should appear in the record, as proper foundation for its
contemplated decision. Of course, further testimony in opposition-
if any-would also have to be admitted. The statute should also pro-
vide that if any of the psychiatric experts disagreed with the decision of
the court, they would be obliged to file in writing their reasons for dis-
agreeing, and that that "critique," along with an opinion which the
court would similarly be obliged to file, would become part of the
record to be considered by the appellate court in the event of an appeal.
The very compulsion to file these statements would itself operate as
a force for agreement between the judge and the psychiatric witnesses.
136 Not only would familiarity with problems of relevancy, hearsay, opinion evi-
dence, and the like prove helpful in evaluating testimony which would no longer be
inadmissible-these objections having been in large part eliminated-but the profes-
sional training of a lawyer or judge should tend to develop some sophistication that
may be helpful in the search for the truth. PLAYFAIR & SINGToN, THE OFFENDERS
281 (1957) suggest, however, that the question of mental capacity must be taken com-
pletely from the courts-that "juries-and, for that matter, judges too-are inevitably
biased by the crime committed."
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B. Standard for Adjudication as a Psychiatric Offender
The Psychiatric Offender Law should provide a vehicle for apply-
ing scientific knowledge at whatever level it has reached at any par-
ticular time. Consequently, the insanity defense standard to be used
with it should impose minimal limitations by way of defining the kind
of mental illness that will exculpate. The Durham standard-that the
"unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect"-is the
broadest proposal that has been advanced; it affords maximum flexi-
bility in incorporating changing psychiatric concepts into the law. If
Durham were to be accepted as the standard for adjudicating a de-
fendant a psychiatric offender, should the day come when reliable
psychiatric authorities substantially agree in defining neurotics or
psychopaths as persons suffering from a "mental disease or defect,"
then defendants in those categories would become proper candidates for
consideration under the statute.
The Durham standard is preferable for purposes of the Psychiatric
Offender Law to that suggested by the American Law Institute for
two reasons. The degree words of the ALT proposal would make it
too easy for "old-fashioned" judges, judges who might have little faith
in psychiatrists, to reject almost all applicants for psychiatric offender
consideration. And the ALT proviso concerning psychopaths would
enact into law a concept which scientific opinion may some day show
to be undesirably rigid.
Because of the breadth of the Durham standard, as well as the
potential divergence of psychiatric opinion today in litigated cases, it
is suggested that in psychiatric offender proceedings the burden of
proving "mental disease or defect" should be on the defendant, sustain-
able by proof constituting the preponderance of the credible evidence.1
3 7
If the burden of proof were to be handled in this fashion, then when
prevalent scientific opinion indicated that an abnormality from which
the defendant suffered constituted a mental disease or defect, he would
be adjudicated a psychiatric offender. This would avoid placing the
prosecution in the impossible position, already considered, of proving
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt in a situation in which credible scien-
tific opinion was split-regardless of how one-sided such split might
be--as to whether or not there was mental illness."8'
137 The burden of proving the criminal act, if it has not been conceded, would
remain on the prosecution, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Although
this complexity of burdens might confuse a jury, judges should be able to handle it
with ease. See also Gasch, Prosecutio Problems Under the Durham Rule, 5 CATH-
oLIc LAv. 5, 32 (1959).
138 A compromise course-that the prosecution have the burden of proving sanity
by a preponderance of the evidence-is rejected. This would weight the scales in
favor of psychiatric offender adjudication, rather than conviction for crime, in in-
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C. Disposition of the Psychiatric Offender
Today, when the defense of insanity is asserted, the jury verdict
must be "not guilty," "guilty," or "not guilty by reason of insanity."
Under a psychiatric offender statute, the choices open to the court
would be to find the defendant "not guilty" or "guilty" or to ad-
judicate him a psychiatric offender. Which course would be proper
would depend upon the sufficiency of proof as to both the criminal act
and mental illness. In any case in which the wrongful act was estab-
lished but no mental disease or defect was proven, the defendant would
be convicted and sentenced in the usual manner. In any case in which
the defendant's criminal conduct was found to be the product of a
mental disease or defect, pursuant to the standard just discussed, he
would be adjudicated a psychiatric offender." 9
The disposition of an adjudicated psychiatric offender should de-
pend on the state of his mental illness at the time of adjudication and
on its prognosis. 4° If his illness has been minor or it is virtually
cured, he might be conditionally released, subject to whatever proba-
tional supervision the court might think desirable. If he is still dan-
gerous, though his illness is treatable, he should be committed to a
curative and rehabilitative institution. And if he is dangerous and
his illness is not subject to any known cure, he should be committed to
an institution where he can be cared for and confined, isolated from
the community, but where he can also be treated should his illness
change or a cure be developed. In determining the proper disposition
of each offender, the court would doubtless rely heavily upon the re-
ports and testimony of the examining psychiatrists and his conferences
with them. This information should be more complete and more care-
fully tested in a properly conducted psychiatric offender proceeding
than in the presentence investigations which are used today in many
jurisdictions. 41 As noted before, the court's action should be subject
to "dissents" by the experts and to appellate review.
stances in which there was roughly an even split in scientific opinion as to whether
or not mental illness existed. Until there has been some experience under the pro-
posed Psychiatric Offender Law, this seems undesirable. Later, however, if the
legislation has worked well in practice, it might be thought desirable to increase the
number of defendants adjudicated under it, and this could be accomplished by altering
the burden of proof or rewriting the standard for adjudication to include, perhaps,
"any other mental disorder."
139 For purposes of such adjudication, the particular crime with which he was
originally charged would be irrelevant As to the wisdom of this kind of elasticity,
see Karpman, supra note 132, at 164-65.
140 For the elements to be considered and their significance, see GUTTMACHER &
WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 396-97 (1952); Waelder, Psychiatry and the
Problem of Criminal Responsibility, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 389-90 (1952).
141 Probation reports, often gathered without any assistance from the accused,
are likely to contain much untested hearsay about the defendant's personality, his
[Vol.llO :771
THE INSANITY DEFENSE-LAW AND REASON
More must be said, however, about the duration of the commit-
ment of psychiatric offenders. The traditional concept of committing
a mentally ill defendant until he regains his sanity is yielding to one
of commitment to last as long as the patient remains potentially dan-
gerous to himself or to others-even although sanity may have been
meanwhile regained.' If defendants are to be encouraged to litigate
the question of mental illness, special attention must be given to the
likely results of defendants' successes in such litigation. The potential
duration of resultant commitments must not be so much longer than
the alternative criminal sentences that defendants would see no ad-
vantage in defending on the ground that they were mentally ill.
There are two ways of accomplishing this end. One is simply to
establish maximum terms for commitments under the Psychiatric
Offender Law corresponding to those under the penal laws. The other
is to adopt flexible sentencing provisions that would permit low-
minimum-to-life sentences for all crimes.143
The latter proposal is unlikely to be accepted. Not only have the
legislatures failed, except in the case of sexual psychopath laws of a few
states,' " to adopt such sentencing laws, but those that do exist have
been employed very cautiously.14 5 Judges tend to set specified terms,
possibly in order to insure that the punishment will not exceed the
crime and that, on the other hand, administrative action will not turn
a dangerous defendant loose prematurely. In short, legislative and
judicial experience seems to indicate that there is little prospect that
sentencing practices soon will be revised in order that they may con-
form with the practice now existing for mental commitments.
family background and education, and so forth. Under a Psychiatric Offender Law,
the defendants cooperation in uncovering and verifying this kind of information can
be anticipated; this and the chance to cross-examine witnesses giving testimony about
the defendants mental health should produce a more accurate and helpful picture.
It has been urged that, in conjunction with retaining McNaughton as the standard
for guilt, an expanded form of probation report be used and psychiatric considerations
be fully explored, in a hearing conducted subsequent to the determination of guilt,
for purposes of aiding the court in making its disposition of the defendant. See
Hofstadter & Levittan, The McNaghton Rules-A Re-Appraisal and a Proposal,
140 N.Y.L.J., Nos. 53-57, Sept. 15-19, 1958, p. 4; Rubin, A New Approach to
M'Naghten v. Durham, 45 J. Ams. Jun. Soc'y 133 (1961); cf. RocnE, THE CRindNw
MIND 272-74 (1958). Although such a procedure would give the court much the
same information as it would be likely to have in a psychiatric offender proceeding,
it is submitted that it comes too late. By the time the judge finds, for example, that
the defendant had no real control over himself when he did the unlawful act, he is
having to decide the fate of one who has already been found guilty.
142 See notes 105-06 supra and accompanying text.
143 See ERixCKSON, WARDEN RAGEN OF JOLIET 237-39 (1957); GuTMAcHER &
WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 444-46 (1952).
14E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1166 (Supp. 1961); see GurrmAcHE &
WEIHOFN, op. cit. supra note 143, at 123-34; WEIHoFEN, MENTAL DIsORDER AS A
CRimiNAr DEFENSE 202-03 (1954).
145 See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Robinson v. Maroney, 175 Pa. Super. 529, 107
A.2d 188 (1954).
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The idea of limiting a mental commitment to a predetermined
number of years, fixed according to the crime that initially led to that
commitment, rather than having its termination depend wholly upon
the patient's recovery, may seem unacceptable at first blush. Logically,
a dangerous person who has committed a crime should be subject to
continued isolation, regardless of the nature of the crime, as long as
he remains dangerous. But this is true whether the crime and the
continued dangerousness are the products of mental illness or of
criminal tendencies that do not rise to the level of mental illness. In
this respect our law has developed along divergent paths: it confines
the person who had initially been charged with a crime and had been
acquitted as insane, and keeps him confined for as long as he remains
dangerous; but it releases after a term of years the criminal whose
wrongful act was identical and whose dangerous propensities are
equally clear, just because he has never, in a court of law, been found
to be "insane."
It is suggested that this duality makes no sense and should be
terminated. A procedure should be instituted providing for the com-
mitment of still dangerous persons who are about to complete a term
of years in a penal establishment or to be released from a mental hos-
pital under the terms of their commitments.14 With such a procedure
146A recommitment procedure for soon-to-be-released but dangerous persons
would be an important aspect of the proposed psychiatric offender scheme. Indeed,
such a procedure would seem desirable in any sentencing scheme other than one
making extensive use of day-to-life sentences. This need is indicated by today's high
rates of recidivism. See, e.g., FEDERAL PRISONs, 1959, at 26, noting that of the 10,613
persons committed to federal prisons during 1959 for terms in excess of one year,
7,179, or 67.6%o, had served previous prison terms. There are laws providing for the
continued commitment of prisoners who are dangerous and insane or mentally incom-
petent. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4247 (1958). It is suggested that such provisions be
extended to apply to persons who may be psychopathic, whether or not they are con-
sidered to be mentally ill.
A recommitment procedure for soon-to-be-released but dangerous persons would
protect defendants to an extent that day-to-life prison sentences and existing mental
commitment procedures do not. The initial period would be roughly proportional to the
severity of the crime, and then the burden would be on the state, through representa-
tives of the institution, to justify the decision to continue depriving the inmate of his
freedom. Cf. Halleck, supra note 107, at 318-20. See also Szasz, Hospital Refusal
To Release Mental Patient, 9 CLE.-MAR. L. REv. 220 (1960).
A procedure calling for civil commitment of persons considered to be dangerous,
if limited in its application to those convicted of crime or adjudicated as psychiatric
offenders would seem to be constitutional. Although it would provide for the com-
mitment of persons some of whom were sane and none of whom had committed any
new crime, as the legislature might have called for the imposition of day-to-life terms
or indeterminate commitments for all such persons initially, this procedure calling for
a good deal less, and basing the decision as to continued commitment on a logical
ground, would seem permissible. There would be, of course, the problem of deter-
mining whether or not a person did represent a continuing danger to himself or to
others. But various statutes and proposals now utilize this test to judge the propriety
of releasing committed persons. See notes 105, 106 Mipra. Taking the same test
but shifting the burden of initiating the procedure to the state and charging it with
the burden of proving the probability of such danger by a preponderance of the evi-
dence should militate in favor of the lawfulness of the proposed statute.
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in force, the initial mental commitment resulting from a psychiatric
offender adjudication might be limited to a specified term of years, with
earlier release permitted whenever the defendant should cease to be
dangerous. The outside limits of initial commitments would be made
proportional to the severity of the underlying criminal acts so that a
defendant would not find himself prejudiced by having chosen to liti-
gate his mental illness under the Psychiatric Offender Law.
147
D. Appeal
In order to minimize the particular idiosyncrasies that particular
trial judges might bring to these novel proceedings, it is suggested
that the appellate courts be given broad power to review and modify
a trial judge's rejection of psychiatric offender adjudication. The ap-
propriate court should be empowered to substitute its own findings of
mental illness for the trial judge's criminal adjudication if one or more
of the psychiatric experts has filed a report asserting grounds for his
"dissent" from the trial judge's actions. Similar broad authority to
review the trial court's exercise of its discretion in its commitment or
sentence of the defendant should also be given.
Although such appellate power should be conferred, it should be
exercised sparingly and with self-restraint. Appellate courts should
recognize that in dealing with a psychiatric offender proceeding, some
depth of understanding of the defendant's personality is desirable. The
full and firsthand familiarity with the witnesses, including the defend-
ant, enjoyed by the trial court ordinarily would far better qualify it in
this regard than would a hasty appellate perusal of a cold trial record,
or even intensive study of some narrow aspects of it. Appreciation of
the significance of this difference in familiarity when dealing with a
question as many-faceted as that of a defendant's mental illness should
inhibit over-hasty reversals.
E. Special Problems of Psychiatric Offender Legislation
The common-law framework for determining criminal guilt is
founded on an adversary relationship between the defendant and the
community which prosecutes him. The defendant is completely re-
lieved of cooperating in the community's effort to prove his guilt.
Moreover, ordinarily he has an absolute right to the choice of that
1
4'7WEIHoFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CR I NAL DEFENSE 203 (1954), notes
that New Jersey, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have la~ws providing that sex offenders
are to be committed to mental institutions, but limiting the time they are to spend
there to the maximum provided by law for the crime for which they have been
convicted.
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method for having the question of his guilt adjudicated that may best
lend itself to efforts on his part at confusion: trial by jury.
The reasons for insistence on adversary proceedings disappear as
the law moves away from rigid concepts of criminal guilt, demanding
retribution, toward increasing recognition that aberrant actions are
likely to be the products of mental illness, and that cure and rehabilita-
tion-rather than vengeance-best serve both the community and the
individual transgressor.
1. Constitutional Objections
Some of the features of the adversary system are locked into our
legal framework by the United States Constitution and the constitu-
tions of many states. For instance, trial by jury is guaranteed, and
legislative efforts to limit such trials solely to the question of whether
the defendants committed the prohibited acts, without regard to their
criminal intent, have foundered on constitutional grounds. 4 s
Constitutional safeguards such as the right to trial by jury and
the privilege against self-incrimination would be inapplicable if psychi-
atric offender proceedings were deemed essentially noncriminal in
nature. 49 But it is unlikely that a body of law that functions in an
area previously considered criminal would be so deemed. Nevertheless,
the constitutional obstacles are not insuperable. Since the safeguards
afforded the defendant can be waived, serious constitutional questions
may never arise if psychiatric offender treatment is not made manda-
tory, but is within the defendant's election. 59
2. Defendant's Election of Psychiatric Offender Consideration
A defendant electing to be considered under the proposed law
would gain certain benefits from this choice. If adjudicated a psychi-
atric offender, he would be spared a criminal conviction, and the sole
aim of his "sentence" would be his cure and rehabilitation. Moreover,
there would be no minimum period for which he would have to be
148 See Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931) ; State v. Strasburg,
60 Wash. 106, 110 Pac. 1020 (1910).
149 Cf. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
150 The rights guaranteed to criminal defendants by the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth
amendments, and by similar provisions of state constitutions are those rights enjoyed
by criminal defendants at the time of the adoption of these constitutional provisions.
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-65 (1932); Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78, 100-02 (1908). Defendants therefore have no constitutional right to adversary
proceedings in which juries will consider the question of whether, under disputed
tenets of modern psychiatry, their wrongful actions resulted from mental illnesses.
In making new standards for exculpation from criminal guilt available to defendants
-not as replacements for the older tests, but as alternatives to them-the law must
be able to provide procedures in which such alternatives will be able to function
effectively. Compare cases cited note 30 supra.
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detained. On the other hand, there are factors that might deter some
defendants from making this choice. Where the illness is dubious or
feigned, the chances of success would be lessened by the informal nature
of the proceedings, including the obligation that the defendant testify
and submit to psychiatric examination, and the loss of the jury as a
factfinder.
It is suggested that for the defendant who fails to elect psychiatric
offender consideration, the alternative should be McNaughton. That
it is the most appropriate standard for use in our common-law jury
trial has already been fully explored. Defense tacticians would thus
be forced to fish or cut bait. If there were genuine indications of seri-
ous mental disorder, they would ordinarily benefit by electing psychi-
atric offender consideration. If not, the weakness of their claim would,
in all likelihood, be revealed by the rigidity of -pure McNaughton.
3. Elimination of the Jury
A number of thoughtful critics, defenders, and historians of the
insanity defense have urged the propriety of leaving the decisional
function with the jury. 5 ' They have suggested that jurors, non-
professionals drawn from the community, give expression to the
"group mind," that they provide some elasticity in law enforcement
which is desirable, and that trial by jury is the essence of our demo-
cratic society.
Much of the reluctance to part with the jury in judging insanity
defenses is based on the feeling that if the law is meticulously applied,
it may on some occasions be harsher than the equities require and that
jurors can give the law humane flexibility.' Tempering justice in
this fashion may be desirable if the standard for mental illness is a
narrow one, such as McNaughton. However, if a new insanity defense
standard is selected because of its alleged scientific soundness, it makes
little sense to urge that the trier of fact used with the old standard,
who imparted to that standard a flexibility not present in its express
151 See ZILBOORG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT 84
(1954); Royal Comm'n Rep. 100; Hall, Responsibility and La ,: In Defense of the
McNaghten Rules, 42 A.B.A.J 917, 987 (1956) ; Moreland, Mental Responsibility
and the Criminal Law-A Defence, 45 Ky. L.J. 213, 219-20 (1956).
15 2 See DEVLiN, TRIAL BY J RY 154 (1956):
The fact that juries pay regard to considerations which the law requires
them to ignore is generally accepted. I do not mean by that that they
frequently and openly flout the law, but that they do not always succeed in
separating the wheat from the chaff. Certainly a jury is not as good a sepa-
rating machine as a judge would be; and the reason why a jury is to be
preferred in some cases is because there are some cases in which a little
admixture of chaff is not a bad thing.
See also note 47 supra.
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language, must be retained with the new. Indeed, to urge that jurors
should be the triers of fact under a psychiatric offender statute because
of the elasticity that they may interpolate into the law would be to
say that although science may tell us that a particular defendant was
mentally ill and that his crime was the product of that illness, if the
community is sufficiently wrought up it should have the right, through
its representatives, the jurors, to abjure science and convict the de-
fendant criminally.'
Moreover, the trial jury is primarily a factfinder. But when
either of the principal new insanity standards is invoked the jurors
serve largely to select an opinion from among the conflicting ones
posed by the experts. Elimination of the jury from such a decision
does not therefore constitute any improper delegation of fact-finding to
a trier other than the jury.
Indeed, as the underlying question posed by the conflict between
the experts under a psychiatric offender statute would be whether the
defendant should be dealt with as a criminal or as an ill person, the
decision for the court would, in a broad sense, be one as to "sentence."
As sentencing responsibility traditionally reposes in the court and is
not the concern of juries, and as a defendant's mental and emotional
picture is properly considered by a court at the time of sentencing, dis-
pensing with the jury in psychiatric offender proceedings seems not
inappropriate.
Lastly, in meeting the argument that opposes taking the sanity
question from the jury, it must be recognized that the determination of
criminal responsibility involves a mixed question of fact and law.
Finding whether or not specific symptoms of abnormality actually
plague the defendant is a question of fact. But assuming that these
symptoms are found, there is still the need to determine whether they
constitute the kind of "mental illness" that will exonerate from crim-
inal guilt. Determination of this question involves a choice for the
trier of fact that has the impact of a rule of law: if "illness" exists, it
operates to excuse from guilt; non-"illness," if found on the same set
of facts, would fail to do so.T5
Because mental illness is this mixed fact and law question, it is
appropriate that it be resolved by a single agency. As the new
standards and trial by jury are largely incompatible, and for the rea-
'53 Perhaps this has been happening in the District of Columbia, where juries,
since Durham, have rendered a number of guilty verdicts in cases in which the appel-
late court has ruled that the records would not sustain a verdict that the defendant's
freedom from mental illness had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. See
cases cited note 98 supra.
154 See Reid, Understanding the New Hampshire Doctrine of Criminal Insanity,
69 YALE L.J. 367, 411-12 (1960).
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sons enumerated in these paragraphs, the judge seems a more suitable
agency for this resolution than does the jury.
IV. CONCLUSION
Only some initial legislation in the direction discussed in this
article and careful administration by able men will tell whether a
psychiatric offender statute is the answer to the insanity defense di-
lemma. It is submitted, however, that one clear truth can be seen
now: if discussions concerning insanity as a criminal defense are to
continue with profit, they must consider more than just drafting a new
insanity "standard" for use in the old procedural framework.
Once we have realized the futility of arguing in the abstract
about formulae, our work may lead to a means of successfully uniting
the age-old principles of law with the newer findings of psychiatry. To
accomplish this, some elements of our older legal institutions may have
to give way to newer counterparts, designed to be workable when
confronted with novel scientific revelations. The proposed outline of
psychiatric offender legislation is offered as one such design.
